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ILLITERACY
Lisa M. Fairfax*
Every financial literacy study conducted over the last few decades
concurs: Americans, including American investors, are financially
illiterate. This Article argues that America’s financial illiteracy poses
a significant, widespread, and long-term challenge for our federal
securities regime because that regime is premised almost entirely on
disclosure as the best form of investor protection and, by extension, on
investors’ ability to understand disclosure. By advancing a typology of
investors and their disclosure needs, this Article further argues that
we may have significantly underestimated the extent of the financial
illiteracy problem based on at least two flawed assumptions. First, we
have presumed that the financial illiteracy problem is limited to retail
investors—individuals (as opposed to institutions) who invest directly
in the securities markets and who represent a small segment of the
overall investor population. However, such a presumption fails to
sufficiently account for the literacy concerns of individuals who invest
indirectly in the market in the form of holdings in mutual funds,
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excellent research assistance from Vincent Glynn, Arie Smith, and Brooke Thompson. As
always, thanks to Roger A. Fairfax, Jr. for your insightful comments as well as your
continuous support and encouragement. All errors, of course, are mine. This Article is
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Hardy—till we meet again, I hope you are resting well with your brother Tommy.
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pension funds, and other institutions, and who comprise a substantial
segment of the market. The second flawed presumption relates to the
notion that disclosure is not intended for the individual retail investor.
Many insist that disclosure is intended for sophisticated institutional
investors and financial intermediaries who provide signals to less
sophisticated investors about suitable investment choices. However,
the anecdotal and empirical evidence suggests not only that our
presumptions about the sophistication of institutional investors and
intermediaries are debatable, but also that such actors do not perform
their signaling function as effectively or as consistently as we
presumed. Thus, the effort to minimize the financial literacy problem
through reliance on these other investors is misguided. Finally, this
Article contends that the very fact that regulators have sought to
combat financial illiteracy for more than two decades without
appreciable changes in financial literacy rates suggests that the
problem may be long-term and that the reform of choice—investor
education—may require supplementation. Based on these conclusions,
this Article insists that we must grapple much more seriously with the
financial literacy problem and offers suggestions about the best path
forward.
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Americans are financially illiterate. This is the consensus of every
financial literacy study conducted over the last few decades,1 despite
studies differing not only in how they define financial literacy, but also
in the metrics they use to measure financial literacy and the groups on

1

See Marco Angrisani, Arie Kapteyn & Annamaria Lusardi, The National Financial
Capability Study: Empirical Findings from the American Life Panel Survey 41 (2016);
Applied Research & Consulting LLC, Financial Capability in the United States: Initial
Report of Research Findings from the 2009 National Survey 37-41 (2009), http://www
.usfinancialcapability.org/downloads/NFCS_2009_Natl_Full_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/8
AWW-L6FV] [hereinafter Financial Capability Study 2009] (finding that Americans have
difficulty with basic financial concepts); Seth L. Elan, Fed. Research Div., Library of Cong.,
Financial Literacy Among Retail Investors in the United States 5 (2011) (noting that since
2006, studies “have consistently found that American investors do not understand the most
basic financial concepts”); Annamaria Lusardi, Noemi Oggero & Paul J. Yakoboski, TIAA
Inst. & Glob. Fin. Literacy Excellence Ctr., The TIAA Institute-GFLEC Personal Finance
Index: A New Measure of Financial Literacy 3–5 (2017), https://www.tiaainstitute
.org/sites/default/files/presentations/2017-04/TIAA%20Institute-GF LEC%20PFin%20Index
%20Report_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/FTC2-YJTK] [hereinafter Lusardi et al., A New
Measure]; Annamaria Lusardi, Financial Literacy: An Essential Tool for Informed
Consumer Choice? 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14084, 2008),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14084.pdf [https://perma.cc/TVK7-4BXV] (noting that most
individuals lack knowledge of basic financial concepts) [hereinafter Lusardi, Financial
Literacy].
An Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) study of some
thirty countries and economies reveals that, similar to the United States, levels of financial
literacy are relatively low around the globe. See Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev.,
OECD/INFE International Survey of Adult Financial Literacy Competencies 7 (2016),
http://www.oecd.org/daf/fin/financial-education/OECD-INFE-International-Survey-ofAdult-Financial-Literacy-Competencies.pdf [https://perma.cc/F24N-A8KM] [hereinafter
OECD Survey]. The study found that “many adults around the world are currently unable to
reach the minimum target score on financial knowledge.” Id. at 9.
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which they focus.2 Most studies refer to financial literacy as the ability
to know and understand basic financial concepts such as interest rates,
risk, and debt.3 Some studies define financial literacy as the ability to
effectively apply basic financial concepts when making financial
decisions, such as choosing among investment options or managing a
budget.4 Moreover, studies have tested a wide array of groups, including
older adults, college students, high school students, women, different
racial groups, and individual investors.5 Irrespective of the definition
utilized, the metric employed, or the group studied, all the studies reach
the same conclusion: The average American, including the average
American investor, does not understand the most rudimentary financial
concepts or how to effectively apply those concepts when making
financial decisions.6 In other words, Americans are financially illiterate.
Such a conclusion has serious implications for the federal securities
law regime for a variety of reasons. First, and perhaps most importantly,
the regime is premised almost entirely upon investors being financially
literate. America’s federal securities law system reflects a deliberate
normative preference for disclosure embodied in the oft-cited refrain
from former Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandies that sunlight is the
best disinfectant.7 The founders of America’s federal securities law
regime rejected other normative models that would have relied on
regulatory evaluation of securities in favor of one focused on disclosure
2

See infra Part I Sections A and B.
See, e.g., Angrisani et al., supra note 1, at 33-34; Lusardi, et al., A New Measure, supra
note 1, at ii, 2-3 (referring to financial literacy as the knowledge and understanding of
personal finances).
4
Letter from David M. Walker, Comptroller Gen. of the U.S., to Chairman and Ranking
Minority Member of S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs and Chairman and
Ranking Minority Member of H. Comm. on Fin. Servs. (Nov. 15, 2004) [hereinafter Letter
from David M. Walker], in U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Highlights of a GAO Forum:
The Federal Government’s Role in Improving Financial Literacy 1 (2004) [hereinafter GAO
Forum] (defining financial literacy as “the ability to make informed judgments and to take
effective actions regarding the current and future use and management of money”); Sandra J.
Huston, Measuring Financial Literacy, 44 J. Consumer Aff. 296, 307 & fig. 1 (2010)
(defining financial literacy to include both a knowledge dimension and an application
dimension, consisting of the “[a]bility and confidence to effectively apply or use knowledge
related to personal finance concepts and products”).
5
See infra Part I Section B.
6
See id.
7
See Louis D. Brandeis, Other People’s Money and How the Bankers Use It 92 (1914)
(“Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants.”); see also 1 Thomas Lee Hazen, Treatise on
the Law of Securities Regulation § 1:16, at 36–37 (7th ed. 2016) (noting that the focus on
disclosure was deliberate).
3
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to investors. The premise was that the best way to protect investors was
to provide them with sufficient disclosure, thereby enabling them to
make informed investment decisions.8 In this regard, the federal
securities law regime is inextricably linked to financial literacy because
the regime presumes investors have the capacity to sufficiently
understand the information being disclosed to them and thus the capacity
to make suitable investment choices for themselves.9 If most Americans
are financially illiterate, this premise is flawed, and so is the normative
foundation of the federal securities law regime. Second, many contend
that market efficiency depends upon financially literate investors.10 In
their view, the securities markets rely at least to some extent upon
investors having the financial capacity to discipline markets by weeding
out inappropriate investment opportunities.11 Financial illiteracy means
that investors are ill-equipped for this task, and thus illiteracy increases
the likelihood that our markets will be inefficient. Third, securities
markets depend, at least in part, upon investors having the capacity to
distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate investment opportunities
to help detect and prevent securities and investment fraud.12 Financial
illiteracy undermines the notion that investors can provide meaningful
assistance in this arena. In other words, financial illiteracy runs counter
to core presumptions, embedded in our securities system, that investors
will have the capacity to protect themselves, discipline the markets, and

8
See J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Regulation of Corporate Disclosure § 4.01 (4th ed. 2018)
(noting that the adoption of the federal securities laws represented a deliberate choice to
embrace the disclosure philosophy articulated by Brandies, coupled with Congress’s
decision to decline approval of a scheme focusing on merit review); Hazen, supra note 7,
§ 1:16 n.4, at 37 (noting that Felix Frankfurter, instrumental in shepherding the Act through
Congress, was greatly influenced by the value of disclosure over merit regulation); id.
§ 1.17, at 38 (noting that after considerable debate Congress “eschewed the idea of a merit
approach” in favor of a system of full disclosure).
9
See infra notes 114-118 and accompanying text.
10
See Brown, supra note 8, § 4.01 (noting connection between disclosure and efficient
pricing in the market); Hazen, supra note 7, § 1:16 nn.4, 6, at 37; Roger J. Dennis,
Materiality and the Efficient Capital Market Model: A Recipe for the Total Mix, 25 Wm. &
Mary L. Rev. 373, 414 (1984); Jonathan R. Macey, A Pox on Both Your Houses: Enron,
Sarbanes–Oxley and the Debate Concerning the Relative Efficacy of Mandatory Versus
Enabling Rules, 81 Wash. U. L.Q. 329, 329 (2003) (noting that “[t]he U.S. securities laws
reflect the deeply imbedded assumption that timely, full, and complete corporate disclosure”
will achieve accurate and efficient pricing of securities).
11
Letter from David M. Walker, in GAO Forum, supra note 4, at 1.
12
See Brown, supra note 8, § 4.01 (noting the theory that abuses could be eliminated
through disclosure, and that duping investors would be more difficult with disclosure).
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help guard against securities fraud. As a result, financial illiteracy poses
a challenge to that system.
This Article makes three contributions. First, it highlights the need to
devote greater resources and attention to this issue. To be sure, for at
least two decades, regulators and other market participants have both
acknowledged and sought to respond to financial illiteracy.13 However,
there has been a dearth of scholarly attention given to its significance.
Second, this Article argues that financial illiteracy poses a significant,
widespread, and long-term challenge to our current federal securities law
regime. Indeed, the very fact that regulators and other market
participants have been seeking to combat financial illiteracy for more
than a decade without appreciable changes to financial illiteracy rates
suggests that the problem may be long term or even intractable.14 Third,
this Article argues for a fundamental shift in our response to the
financial literacy problem. To date, most reform efforts have sought to
tackle the financial literacy problem by focusing on investor behavior.
This Article asserts that it has become clear that we must alter our focus.
Financial illiteracy challenges fundamental presumptions of our system;
the system itself must respond to those challenges. Such a response may
require us to alter that regime to account for illiteracy at all of the critical
stages at which investors are required to make investment decisions.
Part I of this Article expands upon the concept of financial literacy
and demonstrates that financial illiteracy in America is consistently
documented by empirical evidence. Part II demonstrates the manner in
which financial illiteracy poses significant, widespread, and long-term
challenges to our securities law regime. This Part argues that we have
underestimated the problem by suggesting that illiteracy is limited to a
small segment of investors. Instead, Part II demonstrates that the
financial literacy problem encompasses all investors—including those
who invest directly in the market and those who invest indirectly
through various institutions. Importantly, Part II acknowledges that
many may discount the importance of financial illiteracy based on the
contention that disclosure is only intended for sophisticated investors
and financial intermediaries, who not only have the capacity to interpret
complex financial information, but also provide signals that enable less

13
14

See infra Part II Section D.
See id.
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sophisticated investors to make suitable investment choices.15 Part II
demonstrates the flaws in this contention. Part II further demonstrates
that even if investors have significantly greater financial capacity than
noninvestors (a fact which the data does not support),16 the
interconnectedness of our economic system means that the financial
illiteracy of noninvestors still impacts the securities regime. In this
regard, Part II reveals that the financial literacy problem is widespread.
Part II also demonstrates the potentially long-term nature of the problem
by highlighting the significant limits of investor education—the current
reform mechanism of choice. Part III analyzes some of the securities law
implications of the financial illiteracy problem articulated by this
Article. The mission of the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
“SEC”), like that of the federal securities laws in general, is to “[p]rotect
investors[,] [m]aintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets[, and]
[f]acilitate capital formation.”17 Financial illiteracy may undermine the
SEC’s ability to successfully fulfill that mission.

15

See infra Part II Section C.
See infra Part I Section B.
17
Sec. Exch. Comm’n, The Role of the SEC, Investor.gov, https://www.investor.gov
/introduction-investing/basics/role-sec [https://perma.cc/3GMX-GNRZ] (last visited Mar.
14, 2018).
16
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I. FINANCIAL ILLITERACY IN AMERICA
A. Defining Financial Illiteracy
1. Some Reflections on Defining Literacy
Studies differ in how they define financial literacy. Many studies
embrace a cognitive test that defines financial literacy as the extent to
which someone has knowledge and understanding of basic financial
concepts.18 Other studies focus on behavior and the extent to which an
individual can make sound financial choices.19 This Article primarily
adopts the cognitive test for financial literacy.
This Article acknowledges the inextricable link between financial
literacy and financial decision making. Financial literacy is multidimensional and therefore includes both an ability to understand
fundamental financial concepts as well as the ability to understand how
best to effectively apply those concepts when making financial
decisions.20 An individual cannot make effective financial decisions
without sufficient understanding of core financial concepts.21 Studies
reveal that we cannot fully measure the understanding of financial
concepts without testing whether an individual knows how to effectively
apply those concepts.22 Thus, even studies that define financial literacy
to include only a cognitive dimension acknowledge the importance of
18

See Lusardi, et al., A New Measure, supra note 1, at 2.
See Letter from David M. Walker, in GAO Forum, supra note 4, at 1; see also Huston,
supra note 4, at 307 (referring to the ability to understand essential concepts and products as
financial knowledge, which she posits is just one aspect of financial literacy, the other being
the ability to apply financial knowledge).
20
See Lusardi, et al., A New Measure, supra note 1, at 2 (noting that financial literacy
enables sound and effective financial decision making); Lusardi, Financial Literacy, supra
note 1, at 4 (noting the importance of adding data on financial literacy with data on financial
behavior). Recognizing the importance of both concepts, some surveys do combine both
tests. Hence, some studies refer to the combination of financial knowledge and financial
decision making as financial capability, with financial literacy as a component of overall
capability. See Angrisani, et al., supra note 1, at 12; FINRA Inv’r Educ. Found., Financial
Capability in the United States 2016, at 3 (2016), https://www.usfinancialcapability
.org/downloads/NFCS_2015_Report_Natl_Findings.pdf
[https://perma.cc/786D-5S8A]
[hereinafter Financial Capability in the United States 2016].
21
See Angrisani et al., supra note 1, at 12; Financial Capability in the United States 2016,
supra note 20, at 3.
22
See, e.g., Angrisani et al., supra at 1, at 12; Financial Capability in the United States
2016, supra note 20, at 3.
19

COPYRIGHT © 2018 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

2018] The Securities Law Implications of Financial Illiteracy

1073

studying the concepts of knowledge and decision making together in
order to best measure an individual’s financial understanding and
competency.23
However, this Article focuses on the cognitive test for several
reasons. First, such a focus is consistent with the securities law inquiry
of this Article, which centers on the extent to which individuals have
sufficient knowledge of financial concepts to understand information
being disclosed to them. Second, this focus is consistent with the
normative underpinnings of the securities regime, which reject a focus
on the quality of an individual’s decision in favor of a focus on the
provision of information to ensure that individuals have the capacity to
make appropriate decisions.24
Third, there may be many circumstances in which relying on financial
behaviors as a determinant of financial literacy is problematic. This is
because studies use certain behaviors as proxies for whether individuals
appropriately understand the impact of their behaviors on financial
decisions—and hence should be deemed financially literate. However,
the use of such proxies is inexact at best. For example, studies
acknowledge that one critical aspect of financial decision making is the
ability to understand how best to manage debt.25 To test this ability,
studies focus on behaviors such as whether an individual overdraws on
her checking account, pays the minimum balance on her credit card,
uses her credit card for cash advances, or routinely charges more than
the maximum amount of her credit card limit.26 These kinds of behaviors
23
See, e.g., Angrisani et al., supra at 1, at 12; Financial Capability in the United States
2016, supra note 20, at 3.
24
See supra note 8.
25
Studies that define financial literacy in terms of the ability to make informed decisions
around the current and future use of money focus on at least three core financial decisions:
(1) the ability to manage current financial resources; (2) the ability to plan ahead; and (3) the
ability to manage debt and financial products. See, e.g., Angrisani et al., supra note 1, at 12
(noting that financial literacy encompasses managing resources to make ends meet, planning
for the future, and managing debt and financial products); Letter from David M. Walker, in
GAO Forum, supra note 4, at 1 (noting that literacy includes the ability to spend wisely, plan
for the future, including for unexpected events and long-term goals such as college and
retirement, and understand financial choices). The ability to manage debt appropriately is a
component of financial literacy because it helps determine whether an individual appreciates
how best to use her financial resources to experience successful financial outcomes or
otherwise avoid serious financial distress. See Angrisani et al., supra note 1, at 25; Financial
Capability in the United States 2016, supra note 20, at 19.
26
See Financial Capability in the United States 2016, supra note 20, at 7, 21-22. When
testing whether individuals can appropriately manage financial debt, researchers also focus
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subject individuals to high fees and thus may be a sign of financial
irresponsibility.27 However, the studies cannot determine whether an
individual is engaging in such behaviors because she does not
understand their repercussions or because she does not have the ability
to access products that one would deem more financially appropriate.28
In this regard, it seems inappropriate to characterize this behavior as
reflective of financial irresponsibility or illiteracy.
Finally, characterizing a financial decision as appropriate or
inappropriate (or literate or illiterate) contains a value judgment about
individual choice that may be problematic.29 If an individual decides to
overdraw her checking account in order to pay for a child’s college
education, should this be characterized as an inappropriate financial
decision? If the decision is an informed one, there is a strong argument
that it is a misnomer to suggest that the decision is an indicator of
financial illiteracy. Indeed, the premise of our disclosure-based federal
securities system is that so long as individuals make an informed
decision, we should not judge the substance of the ultimate decision.30
From this perspective, the normative assumptions embedded in the
federal system run counter to the notion that we should focus on the
types of decisions people make, and instead suggest that the appropriate
focus should be the cognitive ability to make decisions.
For these reasons, this Article focuses primarily on the cognitive test
for defining financial literacy. To be sure, the behavioral component
must be taken into account, at least at some level. This is because, to a
on the extent to which individuals use nonbank borrowing methods such as payday loans,
auto-title loans or pawnshops. See id. at 25.
27
See id.
28
Similarly, studies indicate that planning ahead for both expected and unexpected
financial events is a critical aspect of financial decision making, and thus financial literacy
because it determines whether individuals can make decisions that will help ensure financial
stability and security. See Angrisani et al., supra note 1, at 18. To test this competency,
studies examine whether an individual saves money for retirement or child’s anticipated
college education, or whether an individual has a “rainy day” fund (defined as three-months’
worth of salary) or can come up with $2,000 within a month to cover financial emergencies.
See id. at 19; Financial Capability in the United States 2016, supra note 20, at 13. However,
the studies cannot differentiate between individuals who do not understand the importance of
planning ahead in these ways, and those who understand but do not have the resources for
such planning.
29
See Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial-Literacy Education, 94 Iowa L. Rev. 197,
275-82 (2008) (discussing concerns related to the “blaming the consumer” mentality
associated with financial literacy education).
30
See supra note 8.
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certain extent, it seems clear that financial literacy includes the cognitive
ability to understand financial concepts as well as the ability to apply
those concepts in various financial settings. Fortunately, the cognitive
and behavioral tests overlap at some level. Moreover, both tests yield the
same empirical results.31
2. Testing the Cognitive Test
In the context of the cognitive test, studies suggest that financial
literacy involves understanding three core concepts: interest rates,
inflation, and risk diversification. In 2004, Professors Annamaria
Lusardi and Olivia Mitchell, two of the acknowledged leaders in the
field of financial literacy, pioneered the first modules for use in testing
financial literacy based on these three core concepts.32 In 2006, Lusardi
and Mitchell transformed those modules into three questions aimed at
testing competency in the three core concepts.33 Two of the questions are
31

See Angrisani et al., supra note 1, at 42; Financial Capability in the United States 2016,
supra note 20, at 3.
32
See Elan, supra note 1, at 6 (noting that Lusardi and Mitchell have conducted focused
research on the financial literacy issue and developed the module that has formed the basis
for most of the financial literacy surveys); Jere R. Behrman et al., How Financial Literacy
Affects Household Wealth Accumulation, 102 Am. Econ. Rev. 300, 301 (2012) [hereinafter
Berhman et al., Household Wealth Accumulation] (noting that the United States Health and
Retirement Study, designed by Lusardi and Mitchell, first tested three core financial literacy
concepts).
33
See Lusardi, Financial Literacy, supra note 1, at 4. Though Lusardi and Mitchell have
refined the three questions over the years, the most recent version of the three questions is as
follows (correct answers marked with asterisks):
Suppose you had $100 in a savings account and the interest rate was 2% per year. After 5
years, how much do you think you would have in the account if you left the money to grow?
•More than $102**
•Exactly $102
•Less than $102
•Do not know
•Refuse to answer
Imagine that the interest rate on your savings account was 1% per year and inflation was 2%
per year. After 1 year, how much would you be able to buy with the money in this account?
•More than today
•Exactly the same
•Less than today**
•Do not know
•Refuse to answer
Please tell me whether this statement is true or false. “Buying a single company’s stock
usually provides a safer return than a stock mutual fund.”
•True
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multiple choice and the third is a true-false question. All the questions
enable respondents to indicate that they “do not know” the answer.
Lusardi and Mitchell believe that these three questions, and the concepts
they represent, are most appropriate for determining whether an
individual possesses basic financial literacy, because the questions
evaluate whether an individual has knowledge of fundamental economic
concepts, competency with basic financial numeracy, and knowledge of
risk diversification.34 The core concepts and questions developed by
Lusardi and Mitchell have been incorporated into a number of studies
that seek to evaluate financial literacy.35
Researchers have developed different ways to test these three core
concepts.36 Some studies merely reproduce the three questions.37 Others
have developed additional questions, with some studies having as few as
five questions,38 and others having as many as fifty questions.39 Even
Lusardi and Mitchell have since expanded the number of survey
questions they employ. In 2016, Lusardi and two colleagues developed a
•False**
•Do not know
•Refuse to answer
See Glob. Fin. Literacy Excellence Ctr., Three Questions to Measure Financial Literacy,
http://gflec.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/3-Questions-Article2.pdf [https://perma.cc/VP5
K-TZLF] (last visited Mar. 14, 2018); see also Jere Behrman et al., Financial Literacy,
Schooling and Wealth Accumulation 9–10 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 16452, 2010), http://www.nber.org/papers/w16452.pdf [https://perma. cc/U6CH-79AA]
[hereinafter Behrman et al., Financial Literacy].
34
See Lusardi, Financial Literacy, supra note 1, at 5.
35
See Elan, supra note 1, at 6; Lusardi et al., A New Measure, supra note 1, at 2 n.1.
36
See, e.g., Angrisani et al., supra note 1, at 34 (using survey questions that are designed
to determine an individual’s understanding of interest rates and how interest is calculated,
the relationship between interest rates and bond prices, and the concept of risk
diversification); Lusardi et al., A New Measure, supra note 1, at 2-3 (using survey questions
to focus on eight areas: earning, consumption, saving, investing, borrowing/managing debt,
insuring, comprehending risk, and go-to information sources); Financial Capability in the
United States 2016, supra note 20, at 28 (questions involving interest rates, inflation, bond
prices, mortgages, and risk).
37
See Behrman et al., Financial Literacy, supra note 33, at 9; Glob. Fin. Literacy
Excellence Ctr., supra note 33 (noting that the three questions have been used in more than
20 countries to measure financial knowledge).
38
See Financial Capability in the United States 2016, supra note 20, at 28.
39
The Jump$tart survey included forty-nine questions for high school students and fiftysix questions for college students. See Lewis Mandell, The Financial Literacy of Young
American Adults: Results of the 2008 National Jump$tart Coalition Survey of High School
Seniors and College Students 10 (2008). Another study included twelve questions. See
Behrman et al., Household Wealth Accumulation, supra note 32, at 301.
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broader set of questions referred to as the Personal Finance Index (the
“Index”) to produce a more nuanced examination of individual
understanding of the core financial concepts in different contexts.40
Irrespective of the number of survey questions used, each study seeks to
measure the same thing—the extent to which individuals understand
rudimentary financial and economic concepts.
B. Documenting America’s Financial Illiteracy
Regardless of how they define and measure financial literacy, studies
uniformly conclude that Americans are not financially literate.41 To be
sure, empirical research on financial literacy is relatively new. Thus, as a
general matter, empirical research in this area only dates back to the
mid-1990s.42 Those initial studies revealed a troubling lack of financial
literacy among Americans.43 Thus, by 2004, the Government
Accounting Office (“GAO”) raised a host of concerns about the
“growing evidence that large numbers of Americans lack knowledge
about basic personal economics and financial planning.”44 Such
concerns spurred an increase in both research and attention on financial
literacy. While the number of financial literacy programs and surveys
increased, however, the findings have remained relatively consistent.
In 2011, the Library of Congress, in partnership with the SEC,
conducted a review of quantitative studies of financial literacy of retail
investors published since 2006.45 The report analyzed ten different
40

See Lusardi et al., A New Measure, supra note 1, at 2-5. While the survey began in
2016, the study publishing the survey results was released in 2017. Id.
41
See Angrisani et al., supra note 1, at 35 (noting that the National Financial Capability
Study’s finding that Americans had a poor knowledge of basic financial concepts was
consistent with the finding of prior national financial literacy studies conducted in 2009 and
2011); Elan, supra note 1, at 1 (noting that the findings about American’s lack of basic
financial literacy was consistent across surveys); Letter from David M. Walker, in GAO
Forum, supra note 4, at 1 (noting the “growing evidence that large numbers of Americans
lack knowledge about basic personal economics and financial planning”).
42
See, e.g., Annamaria Lusardi & Olivia S. Mitchell, Financial Literacy and Retirement
Preparedness: Evidence and Implications for Financial Education, Bus. Econ., Jan. 2007, at
35, 38 (discussing 1995 and 1998 study that first warned of the relationship between
financial literacy and savings and investment); Mandell, supra note 39, at 7-10 (detailing the
first major financial literacy study of high school students).
43
See Lusardi & Mitchell, supra note 42, at 36-39 (reviewing the existing empirical
literature on financial literacy in the United States and around the world).
44
Letter from David M. Walker, in GAO Forum, supra note 4, at 1-2 (pinpointing
evidence from an AARP study and a Jump$tart survey).
45
Elan, supra note 1, at 5.
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studies, many of which focused on the general population, with a few
focusing on subgroups such as women, older Americans, specific racial
groups, and members of the military.46 The report found that the studies
consistently revealed that American investors “do not understand the
most basic financial concepts, such as the time value of money,
compound interest, and inflation.”47
Surveys conducted after the Library of Congress report confirmed
these findings. In 2009, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
(“FINRA”) conducted its first National Financial Capability Study
(“NFC Study”), a nationwide survey aimed at measuring the financial
capacity of Americans.48 The 2009 NFC Study found that Americans
performed poorly on basic financial literacy questions and concluded
that Americans lacked basic financial literacy.49 FINRA conducted
successive surveys in 2012 and 2015, both of which confirmed the
findings of the 2009 NFC Study.50 The 2015 NFC Study concluded that
there were “relatively low levels of financial literacy among
Americans.”51 The survey included five questions covering fundamental
concepts of economics and finance.52 According to the 2015 NFC Study,
only 14% of respondents answered all five survey questions correctly,
while only 37% of respondents answered four or more questions
correctly.53 This reflected a slight downward trend from previous NFC
Studies. In 2012, 39% of respondents answered four or more questions
correctly and 42% answered four or more questions correctly in 2009.54
Overall, therefore, the 2015 results confirmed the findings of earlier
FINRA studies that Americans lacked basic financial literacy.55
A 2012 survey of a nationally representative sample of Americans
similarly found a “lack of financial literacy and poor knowledge of basic

46

See id. at 6, 20.
Id. at 5.
48
See Financial Capability Study 2009, supra note 1, at 3. The Library of Congress report
included the first NFC Survey, but did not include analysis of the 2015 Survey.
49
See id. at 37–41.
50
See Financial Capability in the United States 2016, supra note 20, at 2-3, 28. While the
most recent survey was conducted in 2015, the study publishing the survey results was
released in 2016.
51
Id. at 3, 28.
52
See id. at 28.
53
See id.
54
See id.
55
See Elan, supra note 1, at 1.
47
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economic concepts among American adults.”56 Only 18% of respondents
answered all five of the questions correctly, and only 31% answered four
questions correctly.57 The authors of the report concluded that their
findings revealed a general lack of literacy among Americans, consistent
with the findings of other studies.58
Seeking to add more depth and breadth to their surveys, in 2016,
Lusardi and two colleagues developed the Index. The Index includes
twenty-eight questions aimed at assessing an individual’s knowledge of
fundamental financial concepts.59 In 2016, the Index was used to survey
a nationally representative sample of American adults. The results of the
survey were consistent with earlier studies, revealing that many
Americans lack basic personal finance knowledge.60 According to the
Index survey, the average respondent was able to answer 49% of the
Index questions correctly.61 Sixteen percent of adults demonstrated a
high level of personal finance knowledge and understanding, defined as
being able to answer over 75% of questions correctly, while 20%
showed relatively low levels of financial literacy, defined as answering
25% or less of the questions correctly.62
Financial literacy surveys of younger adults reflect similar findings.
In 1997, the Jump$tart Coalition for Personal Financial Literacy (the
“Jump$tart Coalition”) launched the most comprehensive national
financial literacy survey of high school seniors.63 The survey was
conducted biennially, and produced six surveys between 1997 and
2008.64 In 1997, the average financial literacy score for high school
seniors was 57.3%, which the survey authors defined as a “high flunk.”65
Survey authors hoped that over time the average score would rise to a
“passing” grade of at least 60%.66 Instead, the scores never reached the
initial high flunk grade. The average score for high school seniors was

56

Angrisani et al., supra note 1, at 2, 35.
See id. at 34.
58
See id. at 35.
59
See Lusardi et al., A New Measure, supra note 1, at 2.
60
See id. at 3. The survey focused on Americans ages 18 and older and concluded that
personal finance knowledge among American adults was “modest.”
61
See id.
62
See id.
63
Mandell, supra note 39, at 7.
64
Id. at 7-8.
65
Id. at 8.
66
Id.
57
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51.9% in 2000, 50.2% in 2002, 52.3% in 2004, and 52.4% in 2006.67 By
2008, the financial literacy scores of high school seniors had fallen to an
average score of 48.3%, its lowest level since the survey’s launch.68
Collectively, the average grade for high school seniors over the life of
all of the surveys was a failing grade.69 Indeed, only 10% of high school
students could answer three out of the four questions correctly in the
1997-98 survey.70 Survey authors explained that these results were
especially troubling because they did not capture the many high schoolaged students who did not make it to their senior year, and who were
presumably even less financially literate than the high school seniors
being surveyed.71 The survey is consistent with the findings of later
surveys about younger adults, all of which reveal a lack of
understanding of core financial concepts.72
Surveys of college students, while more promising, also paint a bleak
picture. In 2008, the Jump$tart Coalition survey included college
students for the first time. The survey findings revealed that college
students had an average score of 62.2%, a passing grade, albeit barely.73
The survey authors explained that while such scores indicated that
college education had an impact on financial literacy, they nevertheless
cautioned that the “bad news is that only 28 percent of Americans
graduate from college, leaving nearly three quarters ill-equipped to make
critical financial decisions.”74 Moreover, while college students and
college graduates tend to outperform the general population on these
tests, their scores are often just below or just above the baseline
indicator for financial literacy. For example, the 2015 NFC Study
revealed that respondents with a college education answered an average
of 3.9 questions correctly as compared to the overall average of 3.2.75
Such scores are comparatively better, but still below a passing grade of
at least four questions answered correctly.

67

Id. at 5.
Id. at 5, 8.
69
Id. at 5, 7.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 6.
72
See Financial Capability in the United States 2016, supra note 20, at 30; Lusardi et al., A
New Measure, supra note 1, at 7, 11.
73
Mandell, supra note 39, at 5.
74
Id. at 8-9.
75
See Financial Capability in the United States 2016, supra note 20, at 30.
68

COPYRIGHT © 2018 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

2018] The Securities Law Implications of Financial Illiteracy

1081

Surveys also consistently show that the financial literacy scores of
particular groups are even more troubling. In particular, women, certain
racial groups, and the elderly consistently perform worse than the
general population on financial literacy tests.76 In 2008, while 64.4% of
white high school seniors had a failing grade, 89.1% of African
American seniors had a failing grade, 83.4% of Hispanic seniors had a
failing grade, 77.2% of Asian seniors had a failing grade, and 88.8% of
Native American seniors had a failing grade.77 Thus, while on average
all high school seniors failed to achieve a passing grade, nonwhite high
school seniors had significantly higher fail rates than their white
counterparts. These discrepancies persist in studies of adults. Thus the
2016 Index survey revealed that on average, whites answered 55% of
literacy questions correctly, while nonwhites answered only 39% of
questions correctly.78 While both groups failed to achieve the passing
grade of 60%, whites fared better than nonwhites. In addition, 60% of
whites answered more than half of the questions correctly, while only
27% of nonwhites answered more than half of the questions correctly.79
Plus, while 22% of whites answered more than 75% of the questions
correctly, only 5% of nonwhites did so.80 Thus, albeit a relatively small
percentage of the overall population, a higher percentage of whites
versus nonwhites had what would be deemed a higher level of personal
finance knowledge. These findings were consistent with financial
literacy patterns identified in prior studies.81 In this same vein, the 2015
NFC Study revealed that while whites answered 3.4 questions correctly,
African Americans answered only 2.5 questions correctly and Hispanics
and Asians answered 2.7 and 3.2 questions correctly, respectively.82
Here again the pattern persists—no group achieved a passing grade, but
whites performed better than nonwhites.
A 2017 study of U.S. Hispanics (which the study defined as those of
Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, or other Hispanic descent) found
“substantially low levels of knowledge and understanding of personal

76
See Angrisani et al., supra note 1, at 35 (detailing “substantial differences” in overall
financial literacy levels across particular demographics); Elan, supra note 1, at 1, 24.
77
See Mandell, supra note 39, at 14.
78
See Lusardi et al., A New Measure, supra note 1, at 7.
79
See id. at 8.
80
See id.
81
See id. at 7.
82
See Financial Capability in the United States 2016, supra note 20, at 30.
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finance concepts among Hispanics.”83 Thus, Hispanics answered 40% of
the literacy questions correctly, as compared to 49% for the general
population.84 Moreover, 30% of Hispanics answered more than half of
the questions correctly, as compared to 48% of the general population.85
Empirical evidence also highlights gender differences in financial
literacy rates. Thus, the Index survey revealed that men answered an
average of 51% of questions correctly, while women answered an
average of 48% of questions correctly.86 Moreover, 20% of men answered more than 75% of the questions correctly, while only 13% of
women did so.87 Similarly, the 2015 NFC Study revealed that on average, women answered 2.9 questions correctly while men answered 3.5
questions correctly.88 To be sure, since the baseline for financial literacy
was four correctly answered questions, neither group earned a passing
grade.89 However, the survey confirmed the considerable differences in
overall literacy levels between men and women documented by prior
studies.90
Studies also indicate that Americans lack understanding of key
investment considerations. Thus, the 2016 Index survey found that on
average, individuals answered only 46% of financial literacy questions
related to investing correctly—which also translates into a failing
grade.91
Most importantly for purposes of this Article, studies also confirm
that investors are financially illiterate. Some studies reveal that investors
perform better on financial literacy tests than noninvestors.92
83
TIAA Institute, GFLEC Report Offers Deeper Understanding of Hispanic Financial
Literacy (October 11, 2017), https://www.tiaa.org/public/about-tiaa/news-press/press-releas
es/pressrelease690.html [https://perma.cc/MP64-YQCR]; Andrea Hasler, Annamaria Lusardi
& Paul J. Yakoboski, Financial Literacy among U.S. Hispanics: New Insights from the
Personal Finance (P-Fin) Index 2 (October 2, 2017), https://www.tiaainstitute.org/sites/
default/files/presentations/2017-10/TIAA%20Institute-GFLEC%20Hispanic%20PFin%20Index%20Report_October%202017.pdf [https://perma.cc/5XAS-ZL52].
84
See Hasler et al., supra note 83, at 2. The study also found a significant difference in
literacy rates between Hispanics born in the United States and foreign-born Hispanics. See
id. at 3-6.
85
See id. at 2.
86
See Lusardi et al., A New Measure, supra note 1, at 7.
87
See id. at 8.
88
See Financial Capability in the United States 2016, supra note 20, at 29–30.
89
See id. at 28.
90
See id. at 30.
91
See Lusardi et al., A New Measure, supra note 1, at 5.
92
See Elan, supra note 1, at 6–15.
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Nevertheless, investors’ scores generally do not amount to a passing
grade, and instead reveal that investors, like noninvestors, do not
sufficiently understand basic financial concepts or how best to effectively apply them.93 For example, studies reveal that while investors
perform better than average on some basic financial concepts related to
long-term returns, they did not get a passing grade on concepts related to
interest and diversification.94 The Library of Congress survey of the
financial literacy studies related to investors noted that such studies
“conclude overwhelmingly that American investors lack essential knowledge of the most rudimentary financial concepts . . . Consequently, it is
not surprising that investors do not understand advanced financial
concepts . . . .”95
Collectively, these studies find that Americans are not financially
literate. This finding has been consistent throughout the years in which
Americans have been surveyed. Hence, from the 1990s to 2017, studies
highlight a consistent pattern of financial illiteracy in the American
population. While some studies document small changes from year to
year, those changes do not reflect an appreciable increase in the financial
literacy rates of Americans. Instead, the only clear conclusion that can
be drawn from this decades-plus body of research related to financial
literacy is that, on average, Americans are not financially literate.
C. Literacy Matters
Financial literacy has an impact on both short-term and long-term
individual wellbeing.96 Individuals must make a variety of financial
decisions throughout their lives, including consuming, saving, investing,
borrowing, and insuring.97 These financial decisions not only have
important repercussions, but also are inextricably linked to financial
literacy.98 Studies indicate that people who are financially literate are
more likely to engage in a range of financially responsible behaviors that
increase their financial stability and security, while decreasing their

93

See id. at 5–6.
See id. at 11 (citing study of adult investors).
95
Id. at 25.
96
See Letter from David M. Walker, in GAO Forum, supra note 4, at 1 (noting that a lack
of financial literacy affects individuals’ economic well-being and security).
97
See Lusardi et al., A New Measure, supra note 1, at 2.
98
See Lusardi, Financial Literacy, supra note 1, at 2.
94
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likelihood of encountering financial instability and distress.99 For
example, financially literate individuals are more likely to be able to
manage their current financial obligations, such as balancing monthly
income and expenses.100 They are more likely to successfully manage
debt in ways that avoid financial hardship and upheaval.101 Financially
literate individuals are more likely to plan for the future and save for
anticipated and unanticipated financial events.102 Viewed together,
research clearly demonstrates that individuals with greater financial
knowledge are more likely to experience positive financial outcomes in
a variety of contexts.103 In contrast, financial illiteracy can lead to poor
money management and decision making, which can lower an
individual’s standard of living and undermine her ability to achieve
crucial long-term goals such as buying a home and saving for
retirement.104
Financial literacy also has a significant impact on an individual’s
future economic health. Financial literacy enhances the likelihood that
someone will contribute to her retirement savings, which has significant
short- and long-term implications.105 Indeed, people who are financially
literate are not only more likely to contribute to their retirement savings,
but are also more likely to contribute at an early age, to contribute more
money, and to avoid early withdrawals from their retirement account.106
All of these behaviors increase the likelihood that an individual will
retire with appropriate savings. By contrast, low levels of financial
literacy often translate into difficulty accumulating retirement savings.107
As one survey concluded, “‘[l]ow levels of investor literacy have serious
implications for the ability of broad segments of the population to retire
comfortably.”108
99
See Angrisani et al., supra note 1, at 18; Financial Capability in the United States 2016,
supra note 20, at 19; Hasler et al., supra note 83, at 13 (noting that financial literacy
positively correlates with better financial outcomes); Chiara Monticone, How Much Does
Wealth Matter in the Acquisition of Financial Literacy?, 44 J. Con. Aff. 403, 404 (2010).
100
See Angrisani et al., supra note 1, at 15.
101
See id. at 18.
102
See id.
103
See Lusardi et al., A New Measure, supra note 1, at 16–17.
104
See Letter from David M. Walker, in GAO Forum, supra note 4, at 1.
105
See Behrman et al., Household Wealth Accumulation, supra note 32, at 303.
106
See Financial Capability in the United States 2016, supra note 20, at 15; Lusardi,
Financial Literacy, supra note 1, at 13–14; Lusardi & Mitchell, supra note 42, at 39.
107
See Elan, supra note 1, at 26.
108
See id.
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In addition, financial literacy has both micro- and macro-economic
implications because our economy is interconnected and, as a result,
individual behaviors significantly influence the broader economy.109
Research reveals that households that are more financially literate are
more likely to build wealth for themselves and future generations.110
Because financially literate households are more likely to save, they are
more likely to have resources to pass on to the next generation. In this
regard, financial literacy is one key determinant of the wealth gap in
America because it correlates positively to wealth building,
distinguishing between those who do and those who do not build
wealth.111 As a corollary, this suggests that financial literacy has the
possibility to better ensure that the next generation does not lack the
resources to become more economically mobile, thus increasing the
likelihood that they will be better positioned to take advantage of
opportunities associated with mobility.112 The financial crisis of 2008
was a clear example of the fact that individual financial decisions can
impact the economy as a whole.113 In this regard, financial literacy has
critical implications for individuals and the economy.
II. SECURITIES LAW IMPLICATIONS I: LITERACY MATTERS IN THE
SECURITIES MARKET
Part II of this Article not only identifies why low levels of financial
literacy matter for the securities market, but also why securities
regulators may have underestimated the scope of the financial literacy
problem.

109

See Macey, supra note 10, at 329.
See Behrman et al., Household Wealth Accumulation, supra note 32, at 303.
111
See id.; Annamaria Lusardi & Olivia S. Mitchell, The Economic Importance of
Financial Literacy: Theory and Evidence, 52 J. Econ. Literature 5, 22 (2014) (noting that the
more financially savvy are more likely to undertake retirement planning, and those who plan
for retirement are able to accumulate more wealth than those who don’t); Annamaria
Lusardi, Pierre-Carl Michaud & Olivia S. Mitchell, Optimal Financial Knowledge and
Wealth Inequality 3–4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18669, 2013),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w18669.pdf [https://perma.cc/GT3J-3KK9] (showing the
financial knowledge accounts for large portions of wealth inequality).
112
See Andrea Newell, Closing the Wealth Gap Through Financial Literacy, Fostering
Diversity & Purpose at Work (April 6, 2016), https://www.triplepundit.com/special/
fostering-diversity-and-purpose-at-work/closing-wealth-gap-financial-literacy/
[https://perma.cc/NDP5-6FAS]; Angrisani, et al., supra note 1, at 18.
113
See Lusardi, et al., A New Measure, supra note 1, at 2, 20.
110
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A. Literacy Matters in the Market
1. The Market, Suitable Investment Choices, and Literacy
Our securities regime is premised on disclosure, and by extension, is
premised on the ability of investors to understand the information being
disclosed. In passing the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, founders of the federal securities regime
explicitly rejected other normative framings in favor of disclosure.114 As
Professor Thomas Hazen explains, “It is a basic tenet of federal
securities regulation that investors’ ability to make their own evaluations
of available investments obviates any need that some observers may
perceive for the more costly and time-consuming governmental merit
analysis of the securities being offered.”115 In rejecting a merit-based
system, founders embraced a belief that the best way to protect investors
was to provide them with adequate disclosure so that they could make
their own decisions about suitable investments:116 “The theory behind
the federal regulatory framework is that investors are adequately
protected if all relevant aspects of the securities being marketed are fully
and fairly disclosed. The reasoning is that full disclosure provides
investors with sufficient opportunity to evaluate the merits of an
investment and fend for themselves.”117 The presumption surrounding
the benefits of disclosure is so strong that there is often detailed

114

See Felix Frankfurter, The Federal Securities Act: II, Fortune, Aug. 1933, at 53–54. In
his message to Congress when signing the Securities Act of 1933 into law, President
Franklin Roosevelt stated the government’s actions should not be construed as approving the
soundness or value of securities, but insisted that the government had an obligation to insist
that securities sold be “accompanied by full publicity and information.” President Franklin
D. Roosevelt, Message to Congress (March 29, 1933), quoted in S. Rep. No. 73-85; see also
Hazen, supra note 7, § 1.17; Federal Securities Act: Hearing on H.R. 4314 Before the H.
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong. 53–55, 143–44 (1933).
115
Hazen, supra note 7, § 1.17.
116
See id.; Steven M. Davidoff & Claire A. Hill, Limits of Disclosure, 36 Seattle U. L.
Rev. 599, 605 (2013) (“Disclosure is the sine qua non of the federal securities law.”);
Kenneth B. Firtel, Plain English: A Reappraisal of the Intended Audience of Disclosure
Under the Securities Act of 1933, 72 S. Cal. L. Rev. 851, 858 (1999) (“Congress intended
disclosure to enable the average investor to make an informed investment decision.”); see
also Brown, supra note 8, § 2.01[A] (“[t]he main focus of the securities laws has always
been disclosure” with “investment decisions left in the hands of investors”); id. § 4.01
(noting that disclosure was aimed at providing investors with “an intelligent basis for
forming [a] judgment as to the value of” securities).
117
Hazen, supra note 7, § 1.17.
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disclosure even in offerings that are not subject to mandatory-disclosure
rules.118
The belief that disclosure represents the best form of protecting
investors is challenged if investors are not financially literate. As
regulators have acknowledged, a basic knowledge of financial concepts
and the ability to apply those concepts is crucial for ensuring that
investors can act autonomously, without the aid of regulators.119
However, studies reveal that Americans routinely score very low on
financial literacy questions related to investing, including deciding
among investment choices.120 The literacy problem is underscored when
viewed in the context of federal securities law disclosure. This is
because the concepts being disclosed and the decisions being implicated
by disclosure are far from simple. Hence, the fact that Americans have
difficulty understanding basic financial terms and concepts means that
the problem is even more acute for those American investors tasked with
understanding more complex financial terms and concepts.121
Further evidence that the premises around disclosure may be flawed
stems from literacy data related to risks. On the one hand, research
reveals that understanding about risk and risk assessment impacts an
individual’s ability to make well-informed investment choices.122 On the
other hand, studies consistently reveal that most individuals have a
subpar understanding of risk.123 Overall, financial literacy surrounding
risk is the lowest of all financial concepts, with most Americans
incorrectly answering questions related to risk and risk assessment.124
The 2015 NFC Study revealed that Americans could answer only 46%
of risk-related questions correctly.125 In another recent study, individuals

118

See Davidoff & Hill, supra note 116, at 608.
See OECD Survey, supra note 1, at 19.
120
See Hasler et al., supra note 83, at 12; Lusardi et al., A New Measure, supra note 1, at
119

5.

121
See Elan, supra note 1, at 25–26. Lusardi maintains that knowledge beyond basic
financial concepts is critical for ensuring that individuals can competently make saving and
investment decisions. Such knowledge requires asking additional questions related to bonds,
stocks, mutual funds, and basic asset pricing. See Lusardi, Financial Literacy, supra note 1,
at 7–9. Lusardi found that advanced knowledge is not widespread, even among highly
educated individuals. Id. at 10.
122
See Lusardi et al., A New Measure, supra note 1, at 5.
123
See id. (showing that individual financial knowledge is lowest in the areas of risk).
124
See Hasler et al., supra note 83, at 12.
125
Financial Capability in the United States 2016, supra note 20, at 28.

COPYRIGHT © 2018 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

1088

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 104:1065

answered only 39% of risk-related questions correctly.126 This response
rate was below the 49% average of overall correct answers.127 This study
was therefore consistent with previous research revealing that
individuals experience particular difficulty grasping risk-related
concepts.128 The study concluded that the finding was “particularly
troubling given that risk and uncertainty are common features of
financial decision making.”129 In other words, investors do not appear to
have the financial capacity they need to make many of the risk-related
choices they are called upon to make. Because our securities markets
depend on investors being able to make these choices, their inability to
make them poses a challenge to the markets.
In addition, our securities markets rely upon investors being able to
choose among investment products. However, a basic knowledge of
financial concepts, and the ability to apply those concepts in a financial
context, is crucial for ensuring that investors can compare financial
products and make well-informed decisions about those products.130
Importantly, investors have an increasingly wide and complex array of
investment options available to them.131 A lack of literacy can make
choosing among those options difficult, and the empirical evidence
supports the fact that investors are experiencing significant difficulties in
this area. Moreover, investors are gaining increased responsibility for
making their own investment decisions.132 Historically employers
offered pensions or defined-benefit plans pursuant to which employees
did not have to select among an array of investment options.133 But such
plans have become rare, shifting the responsibility for investment

126

See Lusardi et al., A New Measure, supra note 1, at 5.
See id.
128
See id. at 5–6. The study explains that “[c]omprehending risk involves understanding
that the expected financial outcome in a given scenario depends on the range of possible
outcomes in the scenario, the financial implication associated with each outcome, and the
likelihood of each outcome occurring.” Id. at 6.
129
Id. at 5.
130
See OECD Survey, supra note 1, at 19.
131
See Letter from David M. Walker, in GAO Forum, supra note 4, at 2; Angrisani et al.,
supra note 1, at 25 (noting the fact that investors must understand and choose from among a
variety of complex financial products); Lusardi et al., A New Measure, supra note 1, at 19.
132
See Letter from David M. Walker, in GAO Forum, supra note 4, at 2.
133
See Angrisani et al., supra note 1, at 18 (noting that there has been a progressive shift
towards employer-related retirement plans that place more of the decision making in the
hands of investors).
127

COPYRIGHT © 2018 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

2018] The Securities Law Implications of Financial Illiteracy

1089

selection into the hands of employees.134 The empirical evidence
unequivocally confirms that Americans experience particular difficulty
around making investment choices, and selecting among financial
products and investment types.135 This does not bode well for a system
that increasingly depends upon investors being able to make such
choices in an appropriate manner.
2. Market Discipline, Efficiency, and Literacy
The securities markets also depend, at least to some extent, upon
investors to discipline the market by “choosing appropriate financial
investments, products, and services.”136 Because the market may depend
on investors for such discipline, if investors are not financially
sophisticated, that discipline will be eroded. The evidence surrounding
the ability (or more appropriately, the inability) of investors to
effectively choose among investment products and services highlights
the literacy concerns associated with the expectation that investors can
be a source of market discipline and thus efficiency. Importantly, this
discipline is tied to price efficiency.137 There is debate about the extent
to which disclosure enhances price efficiency.138 However, as one
scholar notes, the federal securities laws “reflect the deeply imbedded
assumption that timely, full, and complete corporate disclosure” will
achieve accurate and efficient pricing of securities.139 Financial illiteracy
means that investors are ill-equipped for this task, increasing the
likelihood that our markets will be inefficient.
134

See id.
See id. at 22–25.
136
Letter from David M. Walker, in GAO Forum, supra note 4, at 1; see also Brown, supra
note 8, § 4.01 (noting connection between disclosure and efficient pricing in the market);
Hazen, supra note 7, § 1:16 (stating that “[t]he focus on disclosure was based on the
conclusion that sunlight is the best disinfectant”); Dennis, supra note 10, at 414 (discussing
the positive role that analysts play in maintaining an efficient market); Macey, supra note 10,
at 329 (arguing that “[t]he ‘demand-side’ of the market must also function” in order to create
accurate and efficient pricing of securities).
137
See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical
Work, 25 J. Fin. 383, 383, 387–88 (1970); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 Va. L. Rev. 549, 637–38 (1984); Jeffrey N. Gordon &
Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Research, 60
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 761, 811–12 (1985).
138
See Allen Ferrell, Measuring the Effects of Mandated Disclosure, 1 Berkeley Bus. L.J.
369 (2004) (highlighting the flaws in the empirical evidence on the connection between
disclosure and price accuracy).
139
Macey, supra note 10, at 329.
135
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3. Fraud and Literacy
Our markets depend on investor literacy to help detect and prevent
fraud.140 Of course, our securities regime includes numerous antifraud
mechanisms aimed at deterring, detecting, and holding individuals
accountable for securities and investment fraud. Still, our markets also
rely on investors to play a role in this endeavor.141 Indeed, in passing the
federal securities laws, Congress intended disclosure to serve as a form
of investor protection from fraudulent securities practices.142 Financial
illiteracy seems to negate the appropriateness of such reliance. Some
have suggested that investors’ inability to understand financial concepts
and compare among appropriate investment choices increases the
likelihood that fraud will occur.143 Moreover, financial illiteracy coupled
with over-confidence in financial knowledge (that is, getting literacy
questions wrong while thinking they are correct) increases the likelihood
of financial fraud and thus also decreases the likelihood that we can
depend on investors to protect against fraud.144 In addition,
technological advances have made it easier to target investors,
increasing their vulnerability to fraudsters seeking to lure them with
inappropriate financial products and investment opportunities.145
Bolstering financial literacy may help combat this vulnerability.146
140

See Angrisani et al., supra note 1, at 25.
See id.
142
See Firtel, supra note 116, at 856–57.
143
See Annamaria Lusardi, Financial Literacy and Financial Decision-Making in Older
Adults, Generations: J. Am. Soc’y on Aging (July 3, 2012), http://www.asaging.org
/blog/financial-literacy-and-financial-decision-making-older-adults [https://perma.cc/639ZDRNM] (discussion correlation between financial literacy and behaviors that make
individuals more susceptible to fraud); S. Duke Han, Financial Literacy: A Way to Address
the Problem of Financial Exploitation?, sifma Blog (Feb. 28, 2017), https://www.sifma.org/
resources/news/financial-literacy-a-way-to-address-the-problem-of-financial-exploitation/
[https://perma.cc/JL4D-Z9UN] (suggesting that financial literacy can be used to combat
financial fraud because greater financial literacy is associated with better financial decision
making). But see NASD Investor Education Foundation, Investor Fraud Study Final Report
5 (May 12, 2006), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/extra/seniors/nasd fraudstudy051206.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4AQ6-FGQ3] (revealing that investment fraud victims have a better
understanding of basic financial literacy than nonvictims).
144
See Keith Jacks Gamble et al., Aging, Financial Literacy, and Fraud 4–5 (Network for
Studies on Pensions, Aging and Retirement, Discussion Paper No. 11/2013-066).
145
See Letter from David M. Walker, in GAO Forum, supra note 4, at 2.
146
By contrast, one survey found that fraud victims score higher than nonvictims on
financial literacy quiz—indicating that even knowledgeable victims are susceptible to fraud.
The survey suggests that improving financial literacy rates may not have an impact on
preventing fraud. See NASD Investor Education Foundation, supra note 143.
141
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This Section argued that financial illiteracy poses challenges for our
disclosure-based securities system, because illiteracy seems to negate
presumptions that are important for the healthy functioning of that
system. The following sections respond to critiques of this argument,
and not only demonstrate the flaws associated with such critiques, but
also that that those critiques have caused us to underestimate the scope
and extent of the challenges posed by financial illiteracy. This
underestimation stems in large part from three problematic notions: (1)
disclosure is not really important to our securities regime, (2) the
financial literacy problem is limited to a small (and potentially
insignificant) segment of the investor population, and (3) investor
education can serve as the almost exclusive anecdote to our financial
literacy concerns.
B. Disclosure Has No Clothes?
One reason for minimizing the importance of the literacy problem in
the context of securities regulation may be that many have questioned
the effectiveness, and hence importance, of disclosure to federal
securities regulation. In other words, if disclosure is not particularly
effective, then the financial literacy problem, or the failure to understand
that disclosure, is not particularly concerning.
The effectiveness of disclosure has been questioned in several ways.
For example, some insist that the information being disclosed in the
market is simply too voluminous to be effectively digested.147 These
critics argue that information overload undermines the efficacy of
disclosure.148 Others contend that information being disclosed to the
market is too complex to be understood by most.149 As one set of experts
147
See Roberta S. Karmel, Disclosure Reform—The SEC is Riding Off in Two Directions
at Once, 71 Bus. Law. 781, 822–23 (2016) (describing reforms focused on information
overload); see also Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its
Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 Wash. U. L.Q. 417, 441–43 (2003); see also
Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950–2005: Of
Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 1465, 1547 (2007) (detailing
significant growth in length of disclosure documents).
148
See Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159
U. Pa. L. Rev. 647, 687–88 (2011) (noting that information overload creates problems with
assimilating, organizing, and analyzing information).
149
See Firtel, supra note 116, at 851, 864 (noting critique that disclosure is too
complicated to be used effectively and that average investor cannot master complexities of
disclosed information); Erik F. Gerding, Disclosure 2.0: Can Technology Solve Overload,
Complexity, and Other Information Failures?, 90 Tul. L. Rev. 1143, 1152 (2016); Henry T.
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notes, “complexity cannot be explained simply.”150 Still others contend
that investors, even the most sophisticated, too often simply either
ignore disclosure or use suboptimal shortcuts to digest disclosed
information.151
A growing body of social psychology and behavioral economics
literature confirms that even when people understand disclosed
information they will often distort, ignore, or misuse that information
when making decisions.152 Such literature therefore supports the
possibility that even investors who we believe to be sophisticated
because they understand disclosed information may have problems
analyzing information and applying that information when making
decisions.153 Empirical evidence showing a significant lack of retail
participation in voting and other investment decisions underscores
investors’ failure to effectively use available disclosures.154 This fact is
further illustrated by evidence of investors’ failure to take advantage of
investor education programs when they are offered to them,155 and the
large number of investors who default into investment products rather
than commit the time and resources to engage with information being
disclosed to them.156 In these ways, critics question the legitimacy of
disclosure as an effective tool for regulating our securities regime. If it is
not a critical component of our securities regime, then literacy may not
be a such a concern.
However, the regulatory response to criticism regarding the
effectiveness of disclosure runs counter to this narrative. The regulatory

C. Hu, Too Complex to Depict? Innovation, “Pure Information,” and the SEC Disclosure
Paradigm, 90 Tex. L. Rev. 1601, 1602 (2012); Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the
Disclosure Paradigm in a World of Complexity, 2004 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1, 4–6.
150
Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 148, at 713 (explaining the difficulty with
presenting complex information in an understandable manner).
151
See id. at 665, 721; Paredes, supra note 147, at 484.
152
See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 148, at 720.
153
See id.
154
See Jill E. Fisch, Standing Voting Instructions: Empowering the Excluded Retail
Investor, 102 Minn. L. Rev. 11, 12 (2017).
155
Financial Capability in the United States 2016, supra note 20, at 32 (revealing that
31% of respondents were offered financial education programs at their school, college, or
workplace, and 21% of them participated).
156
See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 148, at 710 (“Even when people know they
need information, they may not want it enough to labor to acquire it.”); Willis, supra note 29,
at 245–246.
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response has been to shore up, rather than abandon, disclosure.157 With
respect to the issue of information overload, regulators have advanced
several reform efforts aimed at streamlining and reducing disclosure.158
With regard to complexity, some regulators agree that disclosure may
not be completely effective due to the complicated nature of the
information disclosed, and thus mechanisms beyond disclosure, such as
enhanced oversight, may be necessary.159 Other regulators have made
efforts to use disclosure to reduce complexity.160 In fact, some have
insisted that complexity may be the result of opaque or limited
disclosure, thereby suggesting that, rather than render disclosure
ineffective, disclosure may be one way to combat complexity.161 Finally,
in the area of investor apathy towards disclosure, regulators have made
significant attempts to enhance investor participation and thus counteract
that apathy.162 In so doing, regulators appear to reaffirm the importance
of disclosure. The regulatory response, in other words, has been to
double down on disclosure rather than abandon it. To be sure, it is not
clear if such a response will ameliorate concerns about disclosure’s
effectiveness. However, that response does make clear that the
commitment to disclosure continues.163 As a result, the concerns about
financial literacy remain.
Importantly, even critics of disclosure’s effectiveness do not suggest
that we completely eradicate our reliance on disclosure. Instead, those
critics, like regulators, primarily have encouraged a reassessment of
disclosure whereby mechanisms are put in place to better support
disclosure or ensure that disclosure is used in a more targeted or tailored
fashion.164 The fact that even the most ardent critics of disclosure’s

157

See Davidoff & Hill, supra note 116, at 600 (noting that the prescriptions for defects in
disclosure is generally more disclosure); Firtel, supra note 116, at 851 (noting that the SEC
has responded to disclosure concerns with “consistent efforts to make disclosure documents
more readable and understandable”); Karmel, supra note 147, at 788 (noting SEC’s steady
focus on improving disclosure despite criticisms of its effectiveness).
158
See Karmel, supra note 147, at 823–25 (analyzing SEC efforts to modernize and
simplify disclosures).
159
See Gerding, supra note 149, at 1152.
160
See Karmel, supra note 147, at 823–25.
161
See Gerding, supra note 149, at 1158.
162
See Fisch, supra note 154, at 30–39.
163
See Davidoff & Hill, supra note 116, at 607.
164
See id. at 603–04; Paredes, supra note 147, at 484.
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effectiveness shy away from advocating an abandonment of disclosure
underscores its significance to our system of federal regulation.165
C. An Investor By Any Other Name . . .
While regulators appreciate the importance of disclosure, they
nevertheless appear to underestimate the scope of the financial literacy
problem, because they too often frame the problem in a way that appears
to relate only to retail investors—i.e., individuals who invest directly in
the market. Framing the problem as one involving primarily retail
investors has two implications that serve to minimize financial literacy
concerns. First, such a framing suggests that the financial literacy
problem is limited to a relatively small percentage of the investor
population, as retail investors are both a small and shrinking segment of
that population. Second, such a framing suggests that any financial
literacy concerns may be relatively unimportant because disclosures are
arguably not intended for retail investors.166
On the surface, these suggestions have significant merit. First, the fact
that retail investors only represent a small segment of the securities
market creates the impression that the problem of financial literacy is
limited to a relatively small pool of investors. As previously noted, when
an individual invests directly into the securities market, she is referred to
as a retail investor.167 Individuals also can invest in the market indirectly
through institutions such as mutual funds, pension funds, insurance
companies, and hedge funds. When an individual invests indirectly in
the market, the institution (as opposed to the individual) is the investor.
This means that the primary investment decision made by such an
individual is the initial decision to invest in a particular institution.
Historically retail investors dominated the securities market, owning
about 90% of the federal securities market in 1950.168 Today, the
securities market is dominated by institutional investors, with retail

165

See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 148, at 745 (acknowledging that skepticism of
mandated disclosure does not mean that it can never work).
166
See Davidoff & Hill, supra note 116, at 600 (explaining that retail investors might not
be expected to read or understand disclosures); Firtel, supra note 116, at 864; see also
Davidoff & Hill, supra note 116, at 628 (stating that regulators are “not conceptually
troubled by the existence of some retail investors who might be a bit naïve or credulous”).
167
See Lisa M. Fairfax, Shareholder Democracy: A Primer on Shareholder Activism and
Participation 45 (2011).
168
See id. at 45–46.
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investors playing an increasingly small role in the markets, holding at
most about 37% of the securities market.169 The dominance of
institutional shareholders appears to make the financial literacy problem
less acute, because our federal securities laws presume that such
institutions are financially literate, and thus sophisticated enough to
make appropriate investment decisions.170 By comparison, the relatively
small percentage of retail investors suggests that the financial literacy
problem impacts a relatively small segment of the overall securities
market.
Second, if disclosure is not intended for the retail investor, their
literacy or lack thereof should not be concerning. There is considerable
debate regarding the intended audience of disclosure.171 Many contend
that disclosure is not intended for the retail investor.172 Instead,
disclosure is aimed at institutions and other sophisticated investors.173
Disclosure is also directed at financial intermediaries. Financial
intermediaries are financial professionals (both individuals and
institutions), such as securities brokers and even lawyers, who help
facilitate financial transactions.174 They are presumed to have a high
169
See id. at 46; see also Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Federal Reserve
Statistical Release Z.1, Financial Accounts of the United States: Flow of Funds, Balance
Sheets, and Integrated Macroeconomic Accounts, Fourth Quarter 2015 (Mar. 10, 2016), at
126 tbl.L.223 l.11. Studies also show that the vast majority of individual participants in the
market are the richest people in America, and that the top 10% of American households,
defined by total wealth, hold the vast majority of securities. See Jared Bernstein, Yes, Stocks
are Up. But 80 Percent of the Value is Held by the Richest 10 Percent, Wash. Post (March 2,
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2017/03/02/perspective-on-thestock-market-rally-80-of-stock-value-held-by-top-10/; Rob Wile, The Richest 10% of
Americans Now Own 84% of All Stocks, Time (Dec. 19, 2017), http://time.com/money/
5054009/stock-ownership-10-percent-richest/ [https://perma.cc/565Z-HA7G].
170
See Cary Martin, Private Investment Companies in the Wake of the Financial Crisis:
Rethinking the Effectiveness of the Sophisticated Investor Exemption, 37 Del. J. of Corp. L.
49, 67–68 (2012) (discussing the history of Regulation D, the concept of accredited investor,
and the fact that the SEC used the accredited investor standard as a presumption that various
institutions should be deemed financially sophisticated).
171
See Firtel, supra note 116, at 851.
172
See Davidoff & Hill, supra note 116, at 600 (stating that retail investors might not
expected to read or understand disclosures); Firtel, supra note 116, at 864.
173
See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 148, at 732 (finding that securities disclosures
are aimed at sophisticated participants); Davidoff & Hill, supra note 116, at 600 (“Securities
laws rely on the assumption that sophisticated investors read and understand securities
disclosures.”); Firtel, supra note 116, at 864.
174
See generally William O. Fisher, Does the Efficient Market Theory Help Us Do Justice
in a Time of Madness?, 54 Emory L.J. 843, 854–55 (2005) (noting the importance of market
professionals to market efficiency and appropriate price signaling); Kenneth Rosen,
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level of financial sophistication.175 And even though they are not
necessarily investors, such intermediaries collect and analyze
information and then disseminate it to the investing public, sending
signals to retail and other investors about appropriate financial
decisions.176 In contrast, many people argue that retail investors are not
intended or expected to understand disclosures; instead they “free ride”
off of these information signals.177 Their ability to “free ride” appears to
render their financial literacy a moot issue.178 The dominance of
institutional investors, coupled with the presence of financial
intermediaries in the market, may be creating a sense of security that
financial literacy is not a pressing concern for the securities markets,
since those markets do not need to depend upon the financial literacy of
retail investors.
However, this sense of security is false. The notion that disclosure is
not intended for the retail investor, and hence we need not worry about
their ability to understand that disclosure, is both overly simplistic and
inaccurate. In order to better understand why that is so, this Article will
advance a typology of the investment community and its disclosure
needs to highlight the fact that disclosure is important to all investors,
and that the literacy issue raises concern for the effectiveness of
disclosure at all levels. Importantly, this Article acknowledges that the
nature and content of disclosure may differ for distinct types of
investors. However, this Article insists that such different disclosure
needs do not undermine the fact that literacy poses a broad concern for
the securities market.

Financial Intermediaries as Principals and Agents, 48 Wake Forest L. Rev. 625, 628 (2013);
Robert B. Thompson, Market Makers and Vampire Squid: Regulating Securities Markets
After the Financial Meltdown, 89 Wash. U. L. Rev. 323, 331–34 (2011) (explaining the role
intermediaries play in the investing process).
175
See Rosen, supra note 174, at 628–29.
176
See Dennis, supra note 10, at 414; Firtel, supra note 116, at 867–69; Kathryn Judge,
Intermediary Influence, 82 U. Chi. L. Rev. 573, 590–93 (2015); Donald C. Langevoort,
Information Technology and the Structure of Securities Regulation, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 747,
779 (1985) (noting the role analysts play in monitoring companies and influence investors to
purchase or sell securities); Rosen, supra note 174, at 630.
177
See Gerding, supra note 149, at 1153; Firtel, supra note 116, at 867 (noting that
intermediaries perform a filtration function).
178
See Davidoff & Hill, supra note 116, at 628 (noting that because retail investors are not
expected to understand disclosures, regulators are “not conceptually troubled by the
existence of some retail investors who might be a bit naïve or credulous”).
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1. The Individual as Retail Investor
It is noteworthy that while retail investors occupy a small percentage
of the market relative to institutions, such investors nevertheless have a
significant presence in the market. Currently, retail investors hold
approximately 37% of the corporate equities market.179 This represents a
large number of individual investors. Further, the percentage of retail
investors varies from company to company, with some companies
having over 60% of shares held by retail investors.180 Like institutions
that invest directly in the market, retail investors regularly receive
securities law disclosures such as prospectuses, annual reports, quarterly
reports, and proxy statements, all of which are replete with information
about a company and its financial position. While the retail investor pool
may be smaller than the institutional pool, retail investors still represent
a sizeable share of the market and are being asked to engage with
traditional disclosure documents that the financial literacy data suggest
they may not be able to fully understand. The tendency, therefore, to
minimize the financial literacy problem based solely on the percentage
of retail investors is misguided.
Perhaps more importantly, the notion that financial illiteracy does not
matter because retail investors can “free ride” off of more sophisticated
investors is problematic. Retail investors’ ability to “free ride” relies on
several presumptions that are debatable at best. First is the presumption
that institutions and other so-called sophisticated investors are in fact
sophisticated.181 As this Article will discuss further in Subsection II.B.3,
this presumption may be too simplistic. Even if institutional investors
are sophisticated, we also have to presume that such investors are
appropriately incentivized to invest the time and resources necessary for
making suitable investment decisions, thereby signaling that suitability
to retail investors.182 There is little empirical support for this
presumption and evidence to refute it. As an initial matter, the historical
apathy toward shareholder votes within the institutional investment
community seems to cut against this presumption. The tremendous
growth in the proportion of institutional investors fostered a belief that
179

See Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., supra note 169, at 126 tbl.L.223 l.11.
See Fairfax, supra note 167, at 47.
181
See Gerding, supra note 149, at 1153 (noting that concerns about disclosure are “less
worrisome because more sophisticated investors can analyze the products and less
sophisticated investors can free ride off the market price”).
182
Davidoff & Hill, supra note 116, at 622; Thompson, supra note 174, at 342.
180
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such investors would fulfill a much-needed gatekeeping role for retail
investors and other market participants when it came to voting.183
Instead, the empirical evidence revealed that institutional investors had
neither the motivation nor the incentive to perform such a function.184
Even as institutional investors have become more active in recent years,
empirical evidence reveals that many institutional investors still rely
heavily on advisors when making critical voting and investment
decisions.185 Finally, there is anecdotal evidence suggesting that many
institutional investors do not perform their signaling function, or at least
do not perform it in the manner we had expected.186 That evidence
reveals that many sophisticated investors ignore or minimize critical
disclosures.187 This Article acknowledges that many institutional
investors play an important signaling function to the market and other
investors. However, the problem is that this function may not be
performed consistently, or may not be performed consistently in the
manner we have presumed. Even if only some institutional investors fail
to perform their signaling function some of the time,188 the fact that we
cannot rely on them to perform on a consistent basis is problematic if the
primary reason why we are unconcerned about retail investor illiteracy is
that we have confidence in the reliability of the signaling function
played by sophisticated investors.

183
See Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor
Voice, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 811, 812–813 (1992) (noting that large institutions can overcome
the incentives of passivity); Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 Mich.
L. Rev. 520, 523–524 (1990).
184
See Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, supra note 183, at 584, 608.
185
See Tamara C. Belinfanti, The Proxy Advisory and Corporate Governance Industry:
The Case for Increased Oversight and Control, 14 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 384, 394, 398
(2009); Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch & Marcel Kahan, Director Elections and the Role of
Proxy Advisors, 82 S. Cal. L. Rev. 649, 657 (2009); James Woolery, Boards Should
Minimize the Role of Proxy Advisors, Harv. L. Sch. F. on Corp. Governance & Fin. Reg.
(Oct. 31, 2013), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/10/31/boards-should-minimize-therole-of-proxy-advisors/ [https://perma.cc/RE85-XHUN].
186
See John C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does Treasury Have a
Better Idea?, 95 Va. L. Rev. 707, 711–12 (2009); Davidoff & Hill, supra note 116, at 601 n.6
(noting that some sophisticated investors simply followed their peers and the herd without
paying adequate attention to disclosures).
187
See Davidoff & Hill, supra note 116, at 608–26 (describing examples of sophisticated
investors failing to heed warnings contained in disclosures).
188
See id. at 601 n.6 (noting that many institutional investors read and understood
disclosure, but many others did not).
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The notion that retail investors can rely on other investors also
appears to be based on the assumption that institutional investors’
interests are suitably aligned with the interests of retail investors. This
too is a contestable proposition. Shareholders are different. Shareholders
have distinct interests and goals, including varying investment time
horizons.189 This fact undermines the presumption that the interests and
goals of investors will always be aligned, and therefore undermines the
notion that retail investors can predictably rely on institutional investors.
Available evidence suggests that institutional investors diverge sharply
from many retail investors on a host of critical issues.190 By contrast, the
“free rider” claim suggests that retail investors and institutional investors
would resolve disclosed information in the same manner.
The presumption that we can rely on financial intermediaries to cure
the financial literacy concern is also flawed. The flaw stems not only
from the fact that we may have overestimated the financial
sophistication of those intermediaries,191 but also from the fact that such
intermediaries may have conflicts of interests as well as misaligned
incentives that undermine the extent to which they act in the best
interests of investors.192 Similar to sophisticated investors, anecdotal
evidence reveals that intermediaries and market analysts do not perform
their function in the manner we presumed, often merely repeating
information instead of evaluating it.193
Then too, retail investors may not be able to rely upon intermediaries
or even sophisticated investors to fill the gap in their disclosure needs
189
See Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 Stan.
L. Rev. 1255, 1283–92 (2008); Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing
Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 561, 579–93 (2006) [hereinafter Anabtawi, Some
Skepticism].
190
See Anabtawi, Some Skepticism, supra note 189, at 579–93; see also Fisch, supra note
154, at 15; Gretchen Morgenson, Small Investors Support the Boards. But Few of Them
Vote, N.Y. Times (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/06/business/small-inves
tors.html.
191
See sources collected at supra note 151.
192
Brown, supra note 8, § 15.02 (Role of Analysts); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political
Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends to be Frustrated and Systemic Risk
Perpetuated, 97 Cornell L. Rev. 1019, 1032 (2012); Davidoff & Hill, supra note 116, at 622
(discussing conflicts and misaligned incentives of intermediaries); Gerding, supra note 149,
at 1179; Judge, supra note 176, at 595; Thompson, supra note 174, at 342 (pinpointing
incentives that may distort the function of intermediaries).
193
See Brown, supra note 8, § 15.02 (Role of Analysts); Davidoff & Hill, supra note 116,
at 607 n.26 (noting that “people who the securities laws rely on reading and understanding
the disclosure did not do so”).
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for the simple reason that retail investors may engage in markets or
securities transactions that are not closely followed by intermediaries.
Technology has made it easier for retail investors to invest without
interacting with financial intermediaries. Moreover, retail investors may
invest in smaller companies or investment products not on the radar of
intermediaries. Retail investors may also invest in private placements
where robust public information is not available, and again where
financial intermediaries may not be able to play a signaling role. Finally,
when retail investors find themselves drawn into unsuitable or
fraudulent schemes, it is often the case that they engage with
unregulated entities or those who have managed to escape scrutiny from
intermediaries and gatekeepers. In these cases, retail investors may be at
their most vulnerable, and hence any literacy concerns may be especially
worrisome. Yet such cases are situations in which retail investors do not
have the ability to depend on intermediaries to substitute for their gaps
in understanding.
Finally, even if we presume that sophisticated investors and
intermediaries can appropriately perform their signaling function, there
is still reason to be concerned about the literacy levels of any investor
relying on that function. This is because financial literacy experts agree
that a baseline level of financial literacy is necessary in order to
appropriately interpret signals from institutions and intermediaries.194 As
literacy experts have argued, signaling from third parties is most
effective when those receiving the signals can understand, analyze, and
determine how best to adapt those signals to their own individual
circumstances.195 From this perspective, intermediaries and other more
sophisticated investors may be important sources of support, but their
effectiveness will be limited so long as investors do not have their own
capacity to understand investment decisions.196
Importantly, it is clear that securities regulators—who fully appreciate
the prevalence and role of intermediaries and other market
participants—do not believe that such participants obviate the need for
retail investors to be financially literate. Indeed, regulators have
remained committed to enhancing investor education among retail
investors based on their belief that such investors need to have some
194

See Lusardi et al., A New Measure, supra note 1, at 20.
See id. (noting the importance of proactive participation in order for advising to be
meaningful).
196
See id.
195
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capacity on their own. Regulators also strenuously cling to the belief that
disclosures can and should be geared to all investors, including retail
investors, and that retail investors’ financial literacy is central to
ensuring that we meet the goals of our disclosure-based securities
regime.197 Taken together, these observations regarding retail investors
undermine any claims that financial literacy associated with retail
investors is relatively insignificant or not worthy of serious concern.
2. The Individual as Indirect Investor
The fact that individuals invest indirectly in the market through
institutions exacerbates the issues of financial literacy. Indirect investors
comprise a significant component of the market. Empirical evidence
reveals that once we take into account individuals’ indirect holdings (in
the form of holdings in mutual funds, pension funds and insurance
policies), individuals’ effective ownership in the market is closer to
80%.198
Both the nature of the disclosures that indirect investors receive, and
the decisions that they are called upon to make, are different from retail
investors. However, indirect investors are no less important to the
securities market. To be sure, indirect investors are not required to act
upon more traditional disclosure documents. However, they make
investment decisions, and thus we rely upon them to digest disclosures
related to those decisions. Moreover, there is no serious dispute about
the fact that we expect indirect investors to have sufficient capacity to
understand disclosed information and to make critical investment
decisions.199 Indeed, similar to the manner in which the securities regime
relies upon disclosure to those who invest in the traditional company,
our federal securities regime relies upon disclosure provided to the
indirect investor for purposes of investor protection, market efficiency,
and fraud detection and prevention in those markets.200 In other words,

197

See Firtel, supra note 116, at 851, 864.
See Sam Ro, Here’s Who Owns the Stock Market, Business Insider (March 13, 2013),
http://www.businessinsider.com/chart-stock-market-ownership-2013-3
[https://perma.cc/3RMG-XCPL].
199
See Angrisani et al., supra note 1, at 18; Lusardi et al., A New Measure, supra note 1, at
19.
200
See Angrisani et al., supra note 1, at 25; Lusardi et al., A New Measure, supra note 1, at
19 (noting that individuals’ ability to navigate decisions related to investment products is
linked to financial literacy).
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such disclosure is aimed at ensuring that the indirect investor is able to
protect herself when making decisions regarding which mutual fund or
other entity in which to invest, that the indirect investor can
appropriately choose among investment products so that the market for
funds and other institutional investment vehicles is efficient, and that the
indirect investor can help detect and deter fraud. If the indirect investor
cannot adequately perform these tasks, it poses a problem for the
securities regime and the market for these products.
Importantly, unlike with retail investors, no one disputes that the
information provided to indirect investors is meant to be digested by
them, rather than some other market participant. To be sure, indirect
investors have the ability to, and often do, engage with brokers, dealers,
and other investment professionals when making their investment
decisions. However, unlike the retail investors, there is no expectation
that indirect investors should be able to “free ride.” At best, these market
professionals serve in an advisory capacity. Consequently, there is no
serious contention that indirect investors do not need to understand
information being disclosed to them, either directly or indirectly through
an intermediary.
There is also no serious debate about the notion that indirect investors
struggle to make investment decisions. In fact, studies suggest that these
investment decisions (how and to what extent to invest in products being
offered by institutions) pose one of the greatest challenges for
investors.201 Studies also reveal that indirect investors are increasingly
being asked to make these decisions without the benefit of advice, which
further undermines their ability to make sound investment choices.202
Indirect investors also are being asked to make more decisions, and to
make more complicated decisions. Moreover, to the extent indirect
investors receive information orally, experts suggest that oral disclosures
lead to decreased understanding.203
While the disclosure problems may be different in the context of
indirect investors, they are no less acute. Moreover, indirect investors
account for a sizeable number of investors, and thus pose a widespread
problem for the securities regime. Indirect investors’ inability to
effectively make investment decisions not only increases their
201
202
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See Lusardi et al., A New Measure, supra note 1, at 19.
See Angrisani et al., supra note 1, at 18; Lusardi et al., A New Measure, supra note 1, at
See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 148, at 714.
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susceptibility to fraud, but also decreases the likelihood that they will
choose suitable investment products or otherwise ensure a more efficient
market for the indirect investment community. When viewed through
the lens of the indirect investors, it is clear that the financial literacy
problem is severe.
3. The Institution and “Sophisticated” as Investor
Our securities regime presumes—and in many respects depends upon
the presumption—that institutions and some population of investors are
in fact sophisticated. The presumption is not based on any strenuous
criteria or empirical evidence. Federal securities law categorizes certain
institutions and individuals as sophisticated based on financial status or
the amount of assets an institution manages.204 In other words,
sophistication does not turn on any effort to test the financial literacy or
sophistication of any particular individual.205 This fact begs the question
of how we can be sure that institutions or individuals are in fact
sophisticated or financially literate.
In the context of institutions, we know that there are many different
institutional investors.206 Empirical evidence reveals that these
institutions have varying financial capacities and capabilities, again
suggesting that the presumption of institutional investor sophistication is
debatable.207
And there are factors that belie the presumption of institutional
investor sophistication. First, there is significant anecdotal evidence to
suggest that while some institutions may be deemed sophisticated, many
others may not.208 Second, experts have highlighted many instances in
which institutional investors did not make informed investment
204
While the federal securities laws do not define the term “sophisticated,” those laws use
the term “accredited investor” as a proxy for sophistication. See Martin, supra note 170, at
67–68. An accredited investor is determined based on status or financial net worth. See id;
see also 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(1)-(8) (categorizing various institutions as accredited investors); 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5)-(6) (describing accredited investor as applied to a natural
person as an individual with net worth, or joint net worth with the spouse, at the time of purchase exceeds $1,000,000, or with individual income exceeding $200,000 or joint income
exceeding $300,000).
205
See Martin, supra note 170, at 68.
206
See id. at 69–75, 77–80 (discussing institutions such as mutual funds, hedge funds,
endowments and pension plans).
207
See id.
208
See Schwarcz, supra note 149, at 13–15 (noting institutional shareholders’ difficulty in
processing complex information in the structured transactions context).
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decisions.209 This anecdotal evidence is bolstered by the data discussed
below related to institutional investor behavior. On the one hand, many
institutions rely on advisory firms.210 While that reliance stems from
many factors, evidence suggests that at least one of those factors relates
to institutional investors’ lack of capacity to fully understand
disclosures.211 On the other hand, the financial literacy data further
undermines the presumption of institutional investor sophistication (at
least as a universal proposition). Importantly, an institution is only as
sophisticated as the individual or individuals within the institution
making decisions on behalf of the institution. Consequently, to the
extent the available evidence suggests that many people we believed to
be sophisticated are not,212 it also suggests that not all of the institutions
for which such people have responsibility can be deemed sophisticated.
Along these same lines, there is reason to believe that our
presumptions about sophisticated investors may be flawed. Indeed,
while the available empirical data reveals that some investors are more
financially literate than others, it also reveals that many investors would
not get a passing grade on literacy surveys, particularly on issues
germane to making appropriate investment choices.213 The data also
suggest that while there are some investors with a high level of financial
literacy, those investors represent just a fraction of the total
population—according to one study, at most 16%.214 In this regard, the
best available data suggest that there is a distinct possibility that at least
209

See Jennifer S. Taub, The Sophisticated Investor and the Global Financial Crisis, in
Corporate Governance Failures: The Role of Institutional Investors in the Global Financial
Crisis 188, 188–92 (James P. Hawley et al. eds. 2011); Martin, supra note 170, at 51–53;
Randolph Thompson, Mortgage Backed Securities, Wall Street, and the Making of a Global
Financial Crisis, 5 Bus. L. Brief 51, 57 (2008) (noting that institutional investors made
collectively poor decisions); id. at 54 (appearing to question the suggestion that institutional
investors had the financial capacity and literacy to understand certain risks); see also
Davidoff & Hill, supra note 116, at 601 n.6; John E. Girouard, The Sophisticated Investor
Farce, Forbes (March 24, 2009), https://www.forbes.com/2009/03/24/accredited-investorsec-personal-finance-financial-advisor-network-net-worth.html#57508024184b
[https://perma.cc/U4CZ-E3A7] (noting that the way we define sophistication is a farce).
210
See Belinfanti, supra note 185, at 385; Choi et al., supra note 185, at 657; Woolery,
supra note 185, at 1.
211
See Choi et al., supra note 185, at 655 (noting that institutional investors may rely on
proxy advisory services because they lack the staff or expertise to research voting issues
directly).
212
See Angrisani et al., supra note 1, at 41–42.
213
Id.
214
See Lusardi et al., A New Measure, supra note 1, at 3.
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some of the institutions and investors we believe to be sophisticated are
not.
This possibility is disturbing, given that “The assumption that
sophisticated investors read and understand disclosure is a critical one
for the overall capital markets regulatory scheme.”215 The securities
regime is clearly prepared to accept the possibility that retail investors
and even indirect investors may not all be financially literate.216 The
same cannot be said for sophisticated investors,217 as “[o]ur system is
built on taking seriously that sophisticated investors are, well,
sophisticated—disclosure directed to them hits its mark.”218 The fact that
the financial literacy data raise the possibility of financial illiteracy
within the ranks of the sophisticated and institutional investor is thus
very concerning. Again, this Article acknowledges that many investors,
including institutional investors, may in fact be sophisticated. However,
it also acknowledges that some may not be sophisticated and, perhaps
more importantly, we do not have adequate mechanisms for
distinguishing between those who may be sophisticated and those who
may not. Instead, we presume a universal sophistication, and then rely
on that presumption to counter concerns about the understandability of
disclosure.
4. The Prospective Investor and Literacy Beyond the Securities Market
Even if all participants in the securities market are financially literate,
the securities regime must be concerned with financial literacy trends
outside of the markets. The financial crisis demonstrated that the
financial and economic decisions people make outside of the market
influence the securities market and its efficiency and efficacy.219 Thus,
markets must be concerned with financial literacy rates of noninvestors.
We also should be concerned broadly that the literacy rates may be
precluding many people from participating in the securities markets.
This lack of participation has important financial consequences for the
215

Davidoff & Hill, supra note 116, at 601 n.6.
See id. at 627–28.
217
See id.
218
Id.
219
Rosen, supra note 174, at 631 (quoting Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n, The Financial
Crisis Inquiry Report: The Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the
Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States xvi (2011) (noting that a collapse in the
housing market sparked the financial crisis)).
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individuals who do not participate. Empirical evidence suggests that
individuals excluded from the market are likely to incur significant costs
accessing capital, managing debt, and engaging in everyday financial
transactions.220 In this regard, exclusion from the market translates into
unfavorable financial conditions for the excluded individuals.221 On a
micro level, this exclusion is troubling for what it means for people’s
ability to tap into a more efficient and cheaper form of capital and
savings. On a macro level, this exclusion has repercussions for the
securities market. The financial literacy trends could mean that the
number of consumers of the financial market will decrease over time,
causing the markets to contract. Healthy and robust markets need
participants. Financial literacy rates may leave that need unfulfilled. Can
a securities market thrive in the midst of a society where significant
segments of the population are not equipped to participate?
The securities regime should also be concerned with the demographic
patterns associated with financial literacy. Those patterns reveal that
financial literary rates are particularly low for women and particular
ethnic and racial groups.222 As the overall demographic trends change,
these patterns have serious repercussions for the securities market.
Indeed, as experts contend, the economic importance of particular racial
and ethnic groups will grow along with their growth in population.223
Can we sustain a market that does not include groups that comprise an
increasingly large portion of the U.S. population? Can we encourage
such inclusion without addressing the literacy concerns that may be
hindering inclusion? More broadly, empirical evidence reveals a clear
income and wealth gap based on race and gender.224 Many contend that
220

See Angrisani et al., supra note 1, at 26.
See id. at 29.
222
Elan, supra note 1, at 1.
223
See Hasler et al., supra note 83, at 1, 15.
224
See generally Josh Hoxie, Blacks and Latinos Will be Broke in a Few Decades, Fortune
(Sept. 19, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/09/19/racial-inequality-wealth-gap-america/
[https://perma.cc/Y97F-F24W] (comparing the divide in median family wealth between
white, black, and Hispanic families); Tracy Jan, White Families Have Nearly 10 Times the
Net Worth of Black Families. And the Gap is Growing, Wash. Post (Sept. 28, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/09/28/black-and-hispanic-familiesare-making-more-money-but-they-still-lag-far-behind-whites/ (noting that the median net
worth of white families is ten times the size of black families); Niall McCarthy, Racial
Wealth Inequality in the U.S. Is Rampant, Forbes (Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/niallmccarthy/2017/09/14/racial-wealth-inequality-in-the-u-s-is-rampant-infographic
/#64a7830034e8 [https://perma.cc/9FCM-3WCW] (providing an infographic showing the
221
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the gap is due, at least in part, to lack of participation in the securities
market, which in turn is due to reduced financial literacy and financial
capacity among women and certain groups.225 It is not surprising,
therefore, that available data reveals that whites are by far the most
dominant participants in the market, both as retail investors and as
indirect investors.226 A more concerted effort to address the financial
literacy problem could make the securities regime a critical part of the
solution to the wealth and income gap, and its related consequences.
This section contends we may have underestimated the scope of the
financial literacy problem by shying away from the fact that the problem
sweeps more broadly than the retail investor. Individual investors’
indirect ownership patterns, coupled with the inability of investors to
rely on institutions and intermediaries and the interconnectedness of our
economic behaviors, mean that financial literacy has broad implications
for the securities law regime.
D. Education and its Limits
Current reform efforts further underscore the gravity of the financial
literacy problem, by highlighting both the long-term nature of the
scale of America’s racial wealth divide); Laura Shin, The Racial Wealth Gap: Why A
Typical White Household Has 16 Times the Wealth of a Black One, Forbes (Mar. 16, 2015),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/laurashin/2015/03/26/the-racial-wealth-gap-why-a-typicalwhite-household-has-16-times-the-wealth-of-a-black-one/#17888cef1f45
[https://perma.cc/EX84-M66C] (discussing how wealth and income divides occur on racial
and ethnic lines); Mariko Chang, Asset Funders Network, Women and Wealth: Insights for
Grantmakers 5–6 (2015), https://www.mariko-chang.com/AFN_Women_and_Wealth_Brief
_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z9GX-AZQY]; Nikki Graf, Anna Brown & Eileen Patten, The
Narrowing, but Persistent Gender Gap in Pay, Pew Research Center (Apr. 9, 2018),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/04/09/gender-pay-gap-facts/
[https://perma.cc/46LT-5SDB].
225
See Chang, supra note 224, at 10 (stating that women are less likely than men to own
stocks); Jan, supra note 224 (stating that African American families are less likely to own
stocks than white families, and that this difference may have widened the wealth gap
between the two in recent decades); Lusardi & Mitchell, supra note 111, at 22 (noting
several studies that found that financially literate individuals are more likely to invest in
stocks); Newell, supra note 112 (advocating that financial literacy may help narrow wealth
gaps).
226
See Tracy Jan, 1 in 7 White Families Are Now Millionaires. For Black Families, It’s 1
in 50., Wash. Post (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/10/
03/white-families-are-twice-as-likely-to-be-millionaires-as-a-generation-ago/; Allison
Schrager, What the Stock Market Had to Do with Racial Inequality, Bloomberg (Jan. 9,
2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-09/what-the-stock-market-has-todo-with-racial-inequality-iiborp1v.
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problem and the significant difficulties associated with addressing the
problem. Regulators not only have acknowledged the problem of
financial literacy, but also have zeroed in on what they believe to be the
primary means of addressing the problem—investor education.227 As
early as 2004, the GAO proclaimed that financial illiteracy had broad
public policy implications, and launched a forum aimed at gathering
information on how best to address such illiteracy.228 The GAO
specifically emphasized the importance of a financially literate
consumer base to our securities markets. “The financial markets work
best when consumers understand how financial services providers and
products work and know how to choose among them.”229 Regulators also
launched a plethora of educational programs and policies aimed at
addressing the problem. For example, in 2003, Congress passed the Fair
and Accurate Credit Transactions Act, known as the Financial Literacy
and Education Improvement Act,230 which created the Financial Literacy
and Education Commission charged with coordinating federal efforts
and developing a national strategy for promoting financial literacy.231 As
of 2003, some twenty different federal agencies had launched thirty
different programs or initiatives aimed at tackling the problem of
financial illiteracy.232 Such agencies often partner with private entities or
local and state governments.233
Most researchers and financial literacy experts believe that investor
education is the most important tool for combating financial illiteracy.234
Consistent with this belief, studies find that education levels are linked
to financial literacy. For example, one study found that financial
decision making improves with more education. As a result, those with a
high school education or less experience more trouble making
appropriate financial decisions than those with at least a college

227

See Letter from David M. Walker, in GAO Forum, supra note 4, at 3.
Id. at 1.
229
Id.
230
Pub. L. No. 108-159, title V, 117 Stat. 2003 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 9701-08).
231
See id.
232
See Letter from David M. Walker, in GAO Forum, supra note 4, at 3.
233
See id.
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See Lusardi et al., A New Measure, supra note 1, at 20 (citing research showing that
other strategies that do not involve investor education are at best complements to such
education and cannot serve as substitutes). But see Willis, supra note 29, at 201 (noting that
the widespread belief in the effectiveness of financial education lacks empirical support and
is implausible).
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degree.235 Studies find a clear difference in financial literacy rates based
on educational levels, with people who have attained higher levels of
education having greater financial literacy.236 Another study found that
people with a college degree answered 62% of literacy questions
correctly, while those with less than a high school degree only answered
30% of the questions correctly.237 Moreover, participation in financial
education classes or programs enhances financial literacy. Thus, people
who have some exposure to financial education answer 55% of literacy
questions correctly compared with 47% for those with no exposure to
financial education.238 Then too, individuals who have been exposed to
financial education are less likely to indicate that they do not know the
answers to important financial questions.239 With this backdrop in mind,
researchers contend that investor education is critical to tackling the
financial literacy problem, and regulators have focused almost all of
their reform efforts on investor education programs.240
However, reliance on investor education as a cure for the financial
literacy problem is rife with challenges. Indeed, the best evidence
suggests that improving financial literacy requires a change to the K-12
education system, whereby K-12 students are exposed to financial
concepts.241 However, transforming the K-12 curriculum to include
effective financial literacy education is a daunting proposition. It would
first require consensus around the need to include financial education in
the K-12 curriculum—a challenge as it could require trade-offs in the
curriculum that educators and others may be unwilling to make.242 It
then would require the development of a curriculum tailored to meet the
needs of students at varying levels of their educational development.243
235

See Angrisani et al., supra note 1, at 16 (revealing that “the fraction of individuals
experiencing difficulty covering their expenses is 66%, among those with high school or
less, and is reduced to 39% (a 40% reduction) among those with at least a college degree”).
236
See Hasler et al., supra note 83, at 8.
237
See Lusardi et al., A New Measure, supra note 1, at 13.
238
See id.
239
See id. at 15.
240
See Willis, supra note 29, at 199, 201.
241
See GAO Forum, supra note 4, at “Highlights,” 13 (noting that participants in the study
“emphasized the importance . . . of including financial education in school curriculums”);
Lusardi et al., A New Measure, supra note 1, at 20.
242
See GAO Forum, supra note 4, at 13 (noting that many states do not teach financial
education because of limited resources and other priorities in the curriculum).
243
See Elan, supra note 1, at 17 (noting the need to customize financial literacy education
programs); Lusardi, Financial Literacy, supra note 1, at 20.

COPYRIGHT © 2018 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

1110

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 104:1065

Finally, it would require the political will, resolve, and ability to get
such a curriculum adopted in all of the educational jurisdictions in the
United States. Once such a feat is accomplished, it would require
effective training of educators, as well as appropriate tools to test the
effectiveness of the curriculum and modify it when necessary.244 At best,
such a project seems long-term. Even if all of these hurdles were
overcome, researchers agree that it would take some time before the
changed K-12 curriculum would translate into significant changes in
financial literacy levels.245
Investor education outside of the K-12 system poses its own set of
challenges. Regulators have developed a host of different educational
programs aimed at reaching the adult population, ranging from
informational sessions to delivery of self-study materials and interactive
games on the Internet.246 Regulators also have emphasized the
importance of public-private partnerships aimed at targeting different
investor populations.247 Along these lines, regulators have insisted on the
importance of using a variety of methods to reach different audiences
and customizing the information based on those audiences.248 However,
it has proven very difficult to successfully reach the investor community
for purposes of investor education. As researchers note, “many federal,
nonprofit, and financial industry organizations create high-quality
financial education materials that reach relatively few people.”249
Importantly, studies reveal that investors do not seek out financial
advice when they should. There is an inverse relationship with respect to
seeking financial advice, such that those with the lowest levels of
financial literacy are the least likely to seek financial advice.250
However, even for those with high levels of financial knowledge,
seeking professional advice is the exception rather than the rule.251 Then
too, studies reveal that people do not seek out or take advantage of
244
See GAO Forum, supra note 4, at 14 (noting that program evaluation is essential, but
that relatively little had been done to assess literacy programs); Willis, supra note 29, at 204–
11 (noting the existing flaws in the mechanism used to test the effectiveness of financial
literacy education).
245
See Lusardi, Financial Literacy, supra note 1, at 15–16.
246
See Willis, supra note 29, at 202–203.
247
See GAO Forum, supra note 4, at 6–7.
248
See id. at 12; Elan, supra note 1, at 17.
249
GAO Forum, supra note 4, at 12.
250
See Angrisani et al., supra note 1, at 40.
251
See id. (noting that “[s]eeking professional financial advice is not very common among
American adults”).
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investor education programs, even when those programs are easily
accessible, such as when employers periodically offer such programs to
their employees.252
Part of the reason for this behavior may stem from the fact that
investors overestimate their financial knowledge and their ability to
make financial decisions.253 The data suggest that there is a difference
between an individual’s self-perception of their financial literacy and the
reality, with most Americans giving themselves very high scores with
respect to their knowledge of financial matters. For example, 60% of
American adults think they are good with financial matters and at
math.254 Moreover, 72% of American adults rate themselves above
average on their financial knowledge.255 While there is some correlation
between self-perception and the number of correct responses on literacy
questions, there is a “certain degree of disconnect between perceived
and actual financial knowledge.”256 This disconnect is concerning,
because it may suggest that investors may not understand that they are
not equipped to make appropriate investment choices. This disconnect
also may explain why many people do not reach out for help when they
should.257
Another challenge that investor education confronts is the need for
such education to be continuous. Appropriate investor education
requires a baseline exposure and understanding of core financial
concepts, as well as ongoing education on new products and
innovations.258 This is particularly true as the financial and investor
landscape becomes more dynamic and complex, and that landscape

252
See Financial Capability in the United States 2016, supra note 20, at 32 (finding that
less than a third of respondents reported being offered financial education, 21% of
respondents were offered and participated, and 10% of respondents were offered and did not
participate); see also Angrisani et al., supra note 1, at 40.
253
See Angrisani et al., supra note 1, at 41 (noting that a “large fraction [of Americans]
know less about financial matters than they think”).
254
See id. at 34.
255
See id. (noting that 80% of people who manage their household finances believe they
have a firm grasp of financial matters, while 53% of those who do not manage the finances
have such a belief, and that among those who did and did not receive financial education at
school, 65% and 80%, respectively, believe they had a good level of financial knowledge).
256
Id. at 35.
257
See Willis, supra note 29, at 226–53 (emphasizing the prevalence of many different
biases in financial decision making that undermine the ability of investor education to be
effective).
258
See id. at 212–19.
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becomes inundated with an increasing variety of products and choices.259
In this environment, it is not only difficult for the investing public to
keep abreast of changes in market products and services, but it is also
difficult for regulators to design educational programs that keep abreast
of those innovations.260 The result is that “financial-literacy education is
chasing a moving target it will never reach.”261
Perhaps most telling, the focus on enhancing financial literacy
through investor education is more than a decade old,262 and yet there
has been no meaningful change in literacy rates.263 This fact highlights
the difficulties with combating financial illiteracy through such a
vehicle.
As this Part revealed, disclosure is critical to the federal securities law
system and thus the inability of investors to understand disclosure is
critical. While some may seek to minimize the financial literacy
problem, this Part argues that those efforts are based on faulty or
debatable presumptions. Instead, this Article highlights the significant
problems financial illiteracy poses to the securities law system and its
disclosure-based mandate. While this Article does not advocate that we
abandon that mandate, it does argue that we need to carefully and more
appropriately consider how best to respond to these problems. Part III
offers some initial thoughts on the path forward.
III. SECURITIES LAW IMPLICATIONS II: THE SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS
A. Scholarly Attention
To date, there has been very little scholarly attention paid to the issue
of financial literacy. My search uncovered a handful of scholarly articles
directly related to the issue of financial literacy and the securities
markets, many of which are almost ten years old. We would benefit
from increased scholarly attention to the issue of financial illiteracy,
particularly to the extent such attention can expand the discourse on
viable solutions.

259

See id.
See id. at 218–19.
261
See id. at 219.
262
See Letter from David M. Walker, in GAO Forum, supra note 4, at 3.
263
See infra Section I.B.
260

COPYRIGHT © 2018 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

2018] The Securities Law Implications of Financial Illiteracy

1113

B. Education Revisited
At least one commentator has argued that we should abandon the
effort at investor education because that effort cannot yield appropriate
results. In her article, Against Financial-Literacy Education, Professor
Lauren Willis argues that the “belief in the effectiveness of financialliteracy education lacks empirical support.”264 Professor Willis then
documents many methodological flaws and other weaknesses in the
studies that suggest a positive correlation between investor education
and enhanced financial literacy.265 Professor Willis also maintains that
the belief in investor education as an antidote for financial illiteracy is
“implausible, given the velocity of change in the financial marketplace,
the gulf between current consumer skills and those needed to understand
today’s complex nonstandardized financial products, the persistence of
biases in financial decisionmaking, and the disparity between educators
and financial-services firms in resources with which to reach
consumers.”266
This Article agrees that the investor education solution involves
challenges, but does not contend that it should be abandoned. Indeed,
financial literacy experts insist that investor education is the most
important solution to the financial literacy problem, and that other
reforms are at best a substitute or support for investor education,
particularly for a securities regime that will continue to rely on investor
self-help and literacy. In light of their expertise on this issue, we should
give some weight to this insistence. Importantly, while there may be
flaws in the empirical evidence related to the connection between
investor education and enhanced financial literacy, even Professor Willis
concedes that the evidence does not indicate that investor education
cannot be effective under the appropriate circumstances.267 This means
that there is still reason to support investor education. Finally, this
Article insists that it is inadvisable to focus only on one solution.
Investor education should not be the sole focus of our reform efforts.
But neither should any other measure. Given the nature and extent of the
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financial literacy problem, it is clear we need a multitude of solutions to
tackle it.
However, we do need to refocus investor education efforts beyond the
K-12 level to change the nature and manner in which such education is
provided. For example, studies indicate that investor education should
make efforts to more appropriately take into account individual
circumstances and better incorporate one-on-one counseling.268 Also,
investor education must be specifically targeted towards investor
circumstances, and such education must be customized to address the
needs of particular groups.269 We also should consider finding ways to
incentivize investors to obtain investor education, or otherwise mandate
investor education to better ensure that investors are obtaining education
when they need it.
C. Disclosure Revisited
From one perspective, the financial literacy problem may suggest the
inadvisability of a regime that is heavily dependent on disclosure and
hence investor literacy. However, it is not realistic or feasible to
completely dismantle or abandon our disclosure-based federal securities
system. Moreover, there are benefits and drawbacks in any securities
law regime, and hence eschewing disclosure in favor of other models not
only may not ameliorate financial literacy concerns, but also may create
unintended consequences. Hence, this Article does not advocate for a
wholesale rejection of disclosure.
This Article does insist that we must reevaluate disclosure in light of
the financial literacy reality. To be sure, many others have
acknowledged and highlighted the defects and limitations of
disclosure.270 For example, some have raised concerns about appropriate
access to information and related concerns of informational asymmetries
that challenge a disclosure-based regime.271 There also has been
268
See Hasler et al., supra note 83, at 15; Lusardi & Mitchell, supra note 42, at 43;
Lusardi, Financial Literacy, supra note 1, at 20.
269
See Elan, supra note 1, at 17.
270
See Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities
Regulation, 55 Duke L.J. 711, 755 (2006).
271
See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 148, at 651; Paula J. Dalley, The Use and
Misuse of Disclosure as a Regulatory System, 34 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1089, 1103, 1115
(2007); Davidoff & Hill, supra note 116, at 603; Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and
Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote: Toward a More Substantive Approach to Securities
Regulation, 58 Baylor L. Rev. 139, 147–48 (2006).

COPYRIGHT © 2018 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

2018] The Securities Law Implications of Financial Illiteracy

1115

significant discourse around conflicts of interest, regulatory capture, and
misaligned incentives that undermine effective evaluation of information
or otherwise impede effective and full dissemination of information by
investors and financial intermediaries.272 While this discourse around the
limitations of disclosure is important, it falls short of sufficiently
grappling with how best to ensure that investors understand information
once it is disclosed to them. This is because such discourse focuses on
the problems associated with information flows, bias, and incentives
rather than how best to increase understanding of basic financial
concepts.
Of greater relevance to the financial literacy problem has been the
discourse about the extent to which investors and intermediaries
sufficiently understand corporate disclosures. For example, many
scholarly commentators noted that the financial crisis revealed that
intermediaries did an “astonishingly poor job” of interpreting
disclosures.273 By highlighting the fact that many so-called sophisticated
investors and intermediaries failed to understand information being
provided to them, the financial crisis also highlighted the financial
literacy problem and its repercussions.274 Many reforms and proposed
reforms focused on raising awareness of the financial literacy problem
and improving financial literacy.275 The ultimate response focuses
broadly on improving financial literacy among consumers (and thus
does not have a specific focus on investors and the securities market),276
and has resulted in important support for financial education

272
See Macey, supra note 10, at 340–41, 349–50 (pinpointing issues of regulatory capture
and access as well as conflict of interest concerns that undermine the ability of
intermediaries to process and deliver appropriate information and highlighting the need for a
system that reflects true objectivity among outside monitors).
273
See id. at 331.
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Henderson, Self-Regulation for the Mortgage Industry, 2013 U. Chi. Legal F. 229, 239–40
(2013).
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programs.277 However, our ongoing literacy problem reveals that
considerably more work must be done in this area.
The SEC’s “plain English” reform similarly recognized that investors
were having difficulty understanding disclosures.278 In 1998, the SEC
adopted the “plain English” rule in an effort to make disclosure more
understandable, particularly to the ordinary investor.279 For example, the
rule focuses on removing “legal jargon or highly technical business
terms” and reducing the length and density of sentences and
paragraphs.280 However, even that discourse misses the mark because it
does not delve deep enough into the problem. The issue is not
demystifying jargon and complex terms, but rather ensuring an
understanding of basic terms and financial concepts. Therefore, to date,
there has not been enough significant discourse around the fact that
investors and at least some of their advisors may not have the capacity to
process information because they lack basic financial literacy. We must
engage in this discourse if we want disclosure to truly be effective.
D. The Focus on Advisors
The financial literacy problem indicates that we must give significant
attention to the role and duties of financial advisors. Like disclosure,
scholarly attention has focused on concerns regarding advisors and
investor interaction with advisors.281 Such attention has been particularly
focused on the role of advisors who engage with indirect investors when
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they are choosing among investment products.282 The financial literacy
data reveals that these areas are critical not only because the lack of
financial literacy among investors suggests an increased need for
appropriate financial intermediaries, but also because investors
encounter particular difficulties with making decisions about appropriate
and suitable investment products.283 Hence, this Article supports efforts
at reforms focused on advisors.
In addition, this Article contends that our focus on advisors should
delve into several specific areas. First, special attention must be given to
the access and availability of advisors.284 Financial illiteracy means that
investors need the help of advisors. Thus, reforms must be developed to
enhance availability, while any existing rules, regulations, or reforms
must be evaluated to ensure that they do not unduly burden investors’
access to advisors. Second, advising must be free from conflicts of
interests.285 We must pay special attention to ensuring that investor
advice is independent and unbiased.
Third, we must evaluate how best to grapple with investors’
inevitable overreliance on advisors. Studies reveal that investors rely on
their financial advisors more than any other source.286 Studies also reveal
that investors rely on their financial advisors even in circumstances
when they likely should not, such as when there are serious concerns
around conflicts of interest.287 Studies further reveal that investors rely
on individuals who engage with them in the process of selecting
investments even when those individuals do not take on the
responsibility for advising them.288 Finally, studies reveal that some
282
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investors do not investigate their advisor’s background or credentials.289
Viewed together, these studies indicate that financial illiteracy may
create undue reliance on financial professionals. That reliance is
particularly problematic in light of the current environment surrounding
financial and securities professionals. Investors engage with financial
professionals who have different roles and responsibilities towards
investors.290 Research suggests that investors do not sufficiently
understand those differences.291 Current reform measures, including
reforms aimed at imposing a uniform fiduciary duty rule for investors,292
seek to ensure that investors understand the difference between the
professionals on whom they can rely for advice and professionals who
have other roles in the process and thus do not have responsibility for
providing investment advice.293 The financial literacy data suggests that
this may not be sufficient. Instead, we may have to assume that investors
will rely on all professionals precisely because they do not have the
capacity to make decisions on their own, and then design reform efforts
aimed at addressing this inevitable reliance. The concerns surrounding
financial literacy suggest that reform efforts related to the fiduciary duty
of financial professionals must not only focus on reducing confusion
about the role of financial professionals, but also must appropriately
acknowledge the reality of investor reliance as it applies to all financial
professionals.294 Thus, whether or not we embrace a uniform fiduciary
standard, we must think carefully about appropriate mechanisms for
acknowledging the reality of overreliance that appears to be the
inevitable byproduct of financial illiteracy.
Fourth, we should grapple with how best to deal with the concern
regarding investors’ failure to seek out advice. The evidence reveals that
investors are not likely to believe that they need advice or otherwise to
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seek out that advice.295 Indeed, even when investors are offered financial
information or financial advice from their employers, investors routinely
fail to take advantage of such offerings. This means we must develop
and advance solutions that seek to proactively bring the advice to the
investors.
Finally, we must pay particular attention to advice around certain
types of decisions. Importantly, the financial literacy literature reveals
that financial education and advising are best when delivered at
“teachable” moments, when the information is applicable to a particular
decision.296 This means that effective investor education and effective
delivery of investment advice requires that such education be delivered
at the point when investors are making a relevant investment decision.
Thus, we must devise measures to intervene at these important decision
making points.
Advising is not a cure-all. As Lusardi and her colleagues note,
advising cannot do all of the work associated with responding to
financial literacy concerns.297 Indeed, they observe that “receiving
advice and nudges on every financial decision that individuals face is
simply not realistic.”298 Moreover, even if it were realistic, or we could
enhance advice around certain key decisional moments, such actions
would not fully address financial literacy concerns. This is because
individuals need to be proactive participants in their advice sessions in
order to get the best benefit and most suitable advice.299 Professional
financial advice is most effective when investors have the capacity to
understand it and tailor it for their specific needs and circumstances.300
Investors’ active participation is also important because we cannot
ensure that all advice is unbiased and objective. Lusardi and her
colleagues contend that additional guidance from professional advisors
is best viewed as a complement to improved investor education in this
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area.301 However, in light of the limitations of investor education,
advising is clearly an area that merits special attention.
E. Literacy and the Exercise of Shareholder Power
On the one hand, the financial literacy problem suggests that we
should reduce the areas in which investors must make critical investment
decisions. Such a conclusion may not bode well for those investors who
have advocated for increased shareholder power and influence over
corporate affairs. Indeed, in the last decade investors have pushed for,
and been granted, considerably more influence over corporate affairs on
issues ranging from executive compensation decisions to the nomination
and election of directors.302 There has been considerable debate over the
benefits of such an increase.303 Financial illiteracy may provide support
for opponents of such an increase by suggesting that investors do not
have the capacity to responsibly exercise their influence.
However, it is not clear that financial illiteracy dictates a reduction in
shareholder influence, at least as it has currently evolved. To be sure, in
order to responsibly exercise their increased power and authority,
investors clearly need to be well informed about a range of issues,
including financial matters. But there may be reasons why financial
illiteracy is not as concerning in the context of the current shareholder
activism environment. Indeed, the very fact that shareholders have
vociferously advocated for increased power around particular issues may
mean that shareholders are especially motivated and incentivized to seek
advice and gain understanding of the issues around which they have
gained more authority. Indeed, evidence suggests that shareholders have
both the expertise and the incentive to make informed decisions about
the particular issues around which they must exercise enhanced
authority.304 Of note, the financial literacy literature does not suggest
that investors experience difficulty making decisions on all matters
301

See Lusardi et al., A New Measure, supra note 1, at 20; Collins, supra note 299, at 307.
See Fairfax, supra note 167, at 4.
303
See id. at 35–43.
304
See Craig Guillot, More Boards are Consulting Shareholders about Executive
Compensation, Chief Executive (Aug. 5, 2018), https://chiefexecutive.net/more-boards-areconsulting-shareholders-about-executive-compensation/ [https://perma.cc/XD95-EW7J]; see
also Shareholders vs. Management: Split Decision, KelloggInsight (Feb. 2, 2011),
https://insight.kellogg.northwestern.edu/article/shareholders_vs_management_split_decision
(noting that shareholders can make valuable decisions even when they may have less
knowledge than management) [https://perma.cc/3MY8-SMW2].
302

COPYRIGHT © 2018 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

2018] The Securities Law Implications of Financial Illiteracy

1121

impacting the corporation or the market. Thus, the literature may have
particular relevance for decisions implicating financial concerns, but
does not speak to decisions about other issues. Many of the areas around
which shareholders have greater influence do not directly involve
financial matters, or otherwise implicate decisions around which
shareholders have experienced the most difficulty as a result of their
lack of financial literacy.305 Hence, the financial literacy problem does
not necessarily undermine the movement towards increased shareholder
power.
Of course, there are a host of other issues implicated by financial
illiteracy. This Article is just a starting point in considering how such
illiteracy may impact our understanding of issues pertinent to the
securities law regime. More work needs to be done to ensure that we
better understand, acknowledge, and grapple with the securities law
implications of financial illiteracy.
IV. CONCLUSION
Studies conclusively and consistently reveal that Americans lack
basic understanding of financial concepts and how to effectively apply
those concepts in financial decision making. Those studies also reveal
that the American investor is no exception. This Article seeks to sound
the alarm about the clear and consistent findings surrounding financial
illiteracy in the United States.
Financial illiteracy poses challenges to our securities system, because
our system is premised almost entirely on the ability of investors to
understand disclosures and make investment decisions based on those
disclosures. While those challenges have not gone unnoticed, we may
have inappropriately minimized the extent and nature of those
challenges. However, this Article reveals the flaws associated with the
effort to minimize the financial literacy problem. Financial literacy
should not be thought of as an issue impacting solely retail investors, nor
should it be viewed as insignificant based on the presumption that retail
investors can rely on more sophisticated institutions and financial
intermediaries. Perhaps more importantly, this Article demonstrates that
the financial literacy problem cannot be sufficiently ameliorated based
305
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on presumptions about the sophistication of financial institutions and
intermediaries. Collectively, therefore, this Article undermines the
presumptions that have caused us to inappropriately minimize the
significance of the financial literacy problem in the context of the
federal securities regime. As a result, this Article reveals the importance
of financial illiteracy to the overall health of the federal securities
regime, as well as the need to seriously enhance the attention paid to the
issue of financial literacy and its impact on that regime.
This Article also asserts that we may have zeroed in on a solution—
financial education—that has not, and in the near-term and as currently
constructed likely cannot, produce appreciable changes to financial
literacy rates. To be sure, this Article supports the financial education
effort, but acknowledges its limitations. Moreover, this Article argues
that we must address the financial literacy problem with multiple
solutions, rather than zeroing in on one. This Article therefore insists
that we grapple with the financial literacy issue from a different
perspective so that we can make more realistic and meaningful
adjustments to our securities law regime. Americans are financially
illiterate. It is past time that we seriously consider how our disclosurebased securities regime should account for that fact.

